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        lobal governance of outer space activities faces many new regulatory 
challenges stemming from increased private and public ventures. In 1978, 
Donald Kessler, a NASA scientist, cautioned that the proliferation of space 
debris, a byproduct of space activities, may generate a cascade effect of un-
controlled collisions, undermining the use of Earth’s orbits (“Kessler Syn-
drome”).1 But even without such catastrophic consequences, space debris is 
an externality generated by those who launch the material to outer space, 
which increases the resources all participants must expend to conduct space 
activities.2 For policymakers, the main concerns stem from the effects of 
debris on space traffic management and the potential risks to life and prop-
erty from possible accidents.3   
 
1. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: 
The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 2637 (1978). See also 
Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE 475, 
476–82 (2018); STEPHAN HOBE, SPACE LAW 112–14 (2019); Alexander William Salter, Space 
Debris: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Orbital Commons, 19 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY 
LAW REVIEW 221, 224–27 (2016). 
2. On space debris as an international externality, see infra Section II.A.; see generally 
Salter, supra note 1; Akhil Rao & Giacomo Rondina, Cost in Space: Debris and Collison Risk in 
the Orbital Commons (2020), https://akhilrao.github.io/assets/working_papers/Cost_in_ 
Space.pdf; Molly K. Macauley, The Economics of Space Debris: Estimating the Costs and Benefits of 
Debris Mitigation, 115 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 160 (2015). 
3. See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (2007), https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publica-
tions/st_space_49E.pdf [hereinafter COPUOS Guidelines]; G.A. Res. 74/82, International 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Dec. 26, 2019); Inter-Agency Space De-
bris Coordination Committee, IADC-02-01 Rev. 1, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 
(2007), https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/iadc_mitigation_guidelines_rev_1_sep07. 
pdf [hereinafter IADC Guidelines]; Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the 
Vice President et al., Space Policy Directive-3: National Space Traffic Management Policy 
(June 18, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-
directive-3-national-space-traffic-management-policy/ [hereinafter SPD-3]. Others ap-
proached it from a purely environmental angle, see, e.g., Vishakha Gupta, Critique of the In-
ternational Law on Protection of the Outer Space Environment, 14 ASTROPOLITICS 20 (2016); Mary 
Button, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a Model for Regulating 
Orbital Debris, 37 WILLIAM & MARY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 539 












This challenge facing the international community is further exacerbated 
by increasing activities in space,4 reduced governmental control, and incen-
tives for developing countries to attract space investors.5 The underlying pol-
icy problem is compounded by the realization that the generation of space 
debris is, in many instances, a byproduct of developing capabilities and con-
ducting certain space activities that provide for national progress and a wide 
array of domestic benefits.6 In designing a global order for space debris mit-
igation, the international community must, therefore, prioritize the protec-
tion and promotion of the benefits and reduction of the costs from space 
activities for all participants, rather than be fixated on mitigating a particular 
activity’s externality. 
The potential adverse effects for all participants indicate that the mitiga-
tion of space debris provides a classic case for international cooperation.7 
Yet, as this article will explain, the international rules currently in place are 
inadequate8 and can hardly be considered as effective instruments for sway-
ing the policy choices of participants towards reducing space debris.9 Scien-
tists, policymakers, and scholars have proposed various national and inter-
national paths to confront the challenges posed by increased debris. Inter-
national legal scholarship, in particular, has proposed a variety of interna-
tional regimes to govern the interactions between the participants and to 
encourage both the reduction of future debris generation and the removal 
 
4. See Salter, supra note 1, at 223–25; Paul B. Larsen, Minimum International Norms For 
Mitigating Space Traffic, Space Debris, and Near Earth Object Impacts, 83 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 
AND COMMERCE 739, 754–55 (2018); Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 
481; Arpit Gupta, Regulating Space Debris as Separate from Space Objects, 41 UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 224, 225 (2019).  
5. See Larsen, Minimum International Norms For Mitigating Space Traffic, supra note 4. See also 
Gershon Hasin, Developing a Global Order for Space Resources: A Regime Evolution Approach, 52 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2020). 
6. Anél Ferreira-Snyman, The Environmental Responsibility of States for Space Debris and the 
Implications for Developing Countries in Africa, 46 COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 19, 44–55 (2013); Economic and Social Council, Exploring 
Space Technologies for Sustainable Development and the Benefits of International Research Collaboration 
in this Context, U.N. Doc. E/CN.16/2020/3 (Jan. 13, 2020).   
7. Salter, supra note 1, at 237–38. 
8. See Joseph Kurt, Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris 
Crisis Without an International Treaty, 40 WILLIAM & MARY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POL-
ICY REVIEW 305, 313 (2015). 












of existing debris, including mandatory international standards, increased li-
ability, and taxation.10  
Most scholarship on outer space activities tends to view the corpus of 
global governance of the commons as individual specimens to be adapted 
and applied to space. Rather than evaluating other international regimes as 
“roadmaps” from which to deduce not only which but, critically, why certain 
rules were installed by participants, scholars propose to adapt, mutatis mutan-
dis, other international regimes to confront the space debris challenge, with-
out recognizing the distinct interactions underlining those regimes’ develop-
ment. This approach is misguided. It overlooks the fact that the international 
lawmaking process of authoritative decision-making is complex and requires 
careful balancing of the goals and interests of various participants exercising 
different degrees of leverage.11 Since each regime is uniquely produced by 
this process, it is extremely problematic to claim that a regime governing a 
specific sphere of human activity can simply be applied to another regime 
that may, in fact, reflect different sets of participants, interactions, incentives, 
and leverages guiding its unique development. Such an approach may begin 
an analysis but is unlikely to result in success.12 While international regulation 
is targeted at ameliorating the effects of a particular international externality 
or “problem,” the rules are predominantly a product of compromises and 
“package-deals,”13 accounting for various factors besides finding the most 
efficient method for solving the specific problem.  
 
10. See, e.g., PETER STUBBE, STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SPACE DEBRIS ch. 6(III) 
(2017); Arpit Gupta, supra note 4; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1; Rada 
Popova & Volker Schaus, The Legal Framework for Space Debris Remediation as a Tool for Sustain-
ability in Outer Space, 5 AEROSPACE (2018), https://www.mdpi.com/2226-4310/5/2/55]; 
Megan R. Plantz, Orbital Debris: Out of Space, 40 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 585 (2012); Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6; Button, supra note 3.   
11. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World Consti-
tutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 253 (1967). See also 
Harold Hongju Koh, Is There A “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 559 (2007). Although the author appreciates that interna-
tional law does not have a recognized legislator, the functional term “international lawmak-
ing process” refers to the complex process through which international law develops 
through the interactions between affected stakeholders and decisionmakers. 
12. See, e.g., Hasin, supra note 5, § IV.C. 
13. See Hugo Caminos & Michael R. Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law 
and the Package Deal, 79 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 871 (1985). See also, 
1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, 29–













As Professors Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and W. Michael 
Reisman have shown, the development of international law is a process of 
claims and counterclaims, attuned to the interactions between the partici-
pants, based on their goals, interests, and leverages.14 As Professor Harold 
Hongju Koh described, this process occurs transnationally through a circular 
process of interactions, interpretations, and internalizations.15 Through this 
transnational legal process, international law develops in a repetitive process 
in which norms are internationalized from the domestic into the interna-
tional sphere, promogulated and internalized through domestic interactions, 
to then be internationalized again.16 This appreciation for the driving forces 
of the international lawmaking process will inform this article’s identification 
and proposal of an optimum global order for space debris mitigation, one 
which promotes the aggregated gain in values for all participants.  
This article applies the international regime evolution approach the au-
thor developed in a previous article17 to the regulation of space debris by 
focusing on three elements: feasibility, effectiveness, and manageability. For 
an international regime to constitute a probable evolution of international 
law, it must be feasible, meaning that participants are likely to adopt such 
governance through their interactions based on accommodating their con-
flicting goals, interests, and leverages. Effectiveness considers the optimiza-
tion of international values for all participants,18 which may prescribe a less 
than perfect solution for any putative “problem.” Manageability is the final 
yet critical element. It considers a regime’s opposability by outliers, in other 
words, the ability to sway the policy choices of reluctant participants to con-
form with effectiveness. This approach will be applied in both a descriptive 
and a prescriptive manner. 
 
for Determination of Customary International Law, 35 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE 
AND COASTAL LAW 1, 9–12 (2020).  
14. See generally McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 11; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 
& WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA ch. 1 (1962). 
15. See Koh, New Haven, supra note 11, at 567–68. 
16. See id. at 566–68. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NE-
BRASKA LAW REVIEW 181 (1996). 
17. Hasin, supra note 5. 
18. The international “values” are based on the New Haven School of International 
Law and adapted to modern interactions. The term refers to desired events. The author 
considers that wealth, skill or innovation, equity, security, health and safety, human dignity, 
and environmental protection are among the modern international values that participants 












As the article elucidates, global governance for space debris mitigation 
will develop in three distinct stages: coordination, cooperation, and regula-
tion. The effectiveness of the current international rules at the stage of co-
ordination is undermined by present interactions. The article thus recom-
mends that the international community adopt a dynamic, bottom-up, and 
nationally-based cooperation regime to alleviate the risks posed by space de-
bris and promote space activities. This regime will be feasible based on cur-
rent interactions, effective at optimizing the aggregated gain in values, and 
manageable vis-à-vis outliers. Such governance reconciles the interests of the 
various participants involved, given the realities of the international lawmak-
ing process.19 As future developments may render these rules ineffective, the 
final part will outline a further anticipated development.  
Part II will describe the challenges posed by space debris and the current 
international rules. Part III will survey the participants involved and the val-
ues the regime ought to optimize. Part IV will analyze other regimes pro-
posed by scholars to deduce their appropriateness and shortcomings. Part V 
will propose a dynamic international regime for mitigating space debris. 
 
II. SPACE DEBRIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
A. Delineating the Space Debris Problem 
 
The term “space debris” refers to an externality of space activities that cre-
ates risks and increases the costs of space ventures for all participants. This 
debris varies in shapes and sizes, from non-functioning satellites to frag-
ments of spacecraft or launching equipment and even small pieces of metal 
or paint.20 Although large pieces of debris can be monitored, tracked, and 
possibly avoided, smaller pieces may escape current sensor capabilities.21 
These small pieces of debris, potentially numbering in the millions of frag-
ments, pose a significant risk.22 Traveling at high velocity, a piece of paint 
can wreak havoc on a satellite or spacecraft.23 Participants must thus incur 
 
19. As further elaborated below the various participants have distinct goals, interests, 
and leverages to affect the international lawmaking process. They will be discussed in four 
groups: space-capable States, space-incapable States, private parties, and international or-
ganizations. See infra Section III.B.   
20. Nodir Adilov et al., An Economic Analysis of Earth Orbit Pollution, 60 ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 81, 83–85 (2015); Rao & Rondina, supra note 2, at 3. 
21. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 24. 
22. HOBE, supra note 1, at 112–-13; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 37. 












costs to avoid collisions with debris and, if unsuccessful, may suffer losses 
due to accidents.24 
While the risks are real, uncertainty surrounds the specific adverse effects 
and timetables for the cascade process,25 as further confirmed by Kessler’s 
2010 reevaluation of his analysis.26 In other words, while added space debris 
may increase costs and risks, the extent of its future proliferation is unclear, 
as is the possibility and tipping point for a potential catastrophic Kessler 
Syndrome.27 
In contrast to scholars, who assert that such risks require an urgent rem-
edy,28 international policymakers have responded in measured steps by 
adopting only non-legally binding guidelines and promoting declaratory 
commitments.29 This may stem from a discounting of risks by the latter be-
cause, given the vastness of space, the probability of collisions with small 
pieces of unidentifiable and untraceable debris is minimal at this point. 
Nonetheless, the risks and costs will increase unless participants undertake 
mitigation efforts. Costly maneuvers have already been executed to evade 
collisions,30 and while accidents have thus far been rare, debris proliferation 
and the introduction of mega-constellations will increase their likelihood.  
While some elements of space debris, such as radioactive components, 
may pose increased environmental or safety risks,31 space debris can be ac-
curately depicted, in general terms, as a traffic management problem that 
mainly affects the costs and risks associating with coordinating and safely 
 
24. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 6, at 29; Salter, supra note 1, at 227–32; Kurt, supra note 
8, at 308. 
25. See Kurt, supra note 8, at 316; Rao & Rondina, supra note 2, at 3. 
26. Kessler et al., The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations (2010), 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.394.6767&rep=rep1&type= 
pdf. 
27. Id.  
28. See, e.g., Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 92; Ram S. Jakhu, Yaw Out Nyampong & 
Tommaso Sgobba, Regulatory Framework and Organization for Space Debris Removal and on Orbit 
Servicing of Satellites, 4 JOURNAL OF SPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING 129, 129–30 (2017); Chel-
sea Muñoz-Patchen, Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property 
in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty, 19 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 
241 (2018). 
29. COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 3; IADC Guidelines, supra note 3; Artemis Ac-
cords, Oct. 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Ac-
cords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf.  
30. Jeff Foust, Space Station Maneuvers to Avoid Debris, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://spacenews.com/space-station-maneuvers-to-avoid-debris/.  












conducting launches, in-space activities, and re-entry. As such, a certain de-
gree of adaptation is possible via the implementation of increased tracking, 
avoidance, and protective capabilities.32 Yet, adaptation alone is insufficient 
as further proliferation may reduce its effectiveness.33 International regula-
tion must therefore strike a balance between adaptation and mitigation. 
 
B. Current International Rules  
 
To properly anticipate the regime’s evolution through the international law-
making process first requires evaluating the degree to which current interna-
tional rules affect the policy choices of various participants. It is important 
to appreciate that the corpus of international law governing a putative sub-
ject matter or activity is complex, potentially encompassing multiple regimes, 
with direct and indirect effects, intentional or inadvertent.34 In respect of 
space debris, direct rules include those codified in international treaties re-
lating to outer space activities, non-legally binding guidelines,35 U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions,36 and general international law. Given these rules’ rel-
ative weakness and vagueness as they pertain to debris, the importance of 
indirect rules increases. As explained below, space debris mitigation is af-
fected by rules primarily directed at other spheres of activity, such as inter-
national environmental law and international investment law, presenting 
challenges and opportunities. 
  
1. Treaties Regulating Outer Space Activities 
 
Five treaties have been concluded to govern outer space activities: (1) Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer 
 
32. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 481–82; Joseph N. Pelton, 
Tracking of Orbital Debris and Avoidance of Satellite Collisions, in HANDBOOK OF SATELLITE AP-
PLICATIONS (Joseph N. Pelton et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017), https://link.springer.com/reference-
workentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4614-6423-5_106-2; Space Debris and Space Traffic Management, 
AEROSPACE (Nov. 14, 2018), https://aerospace.org/article/space-debris-and-space-traffic-
management. 
33. See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 482. 
34. See Karen J. Alter & Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International Regime Complexity (UCLA 
School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-47, Northwestern Public Law Research 
Paper No. 17-30, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3085043. 
35. COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 3; IADC Guidelines, supra note 3.   












Space Treaty);37 (2) Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention);38 (3) Convention on Regis-
tration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention);39 
(4) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space;40 and (5) Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.41 
Of these, only the first four may be deemed effective international law be-
tween the space-capable States,42 and only the first three prescribe norms 
affecting space debris. Commentators recognize these treaties’ limited ap-
plicability but overestimate their effects on participants’ decisions regarding 
space debris mitigation. 
The Outer Space Treaty was formulated during the Cold War when pri-
vate space activities were works of fiction and the challenges of space traffic 
management were unappreciated. The appropriateness of the Outer Space 
Treaty as an instrument of global governance for modern interactions is thus 
doubtful. Many authors, however, attribute somewhat excessive qualities to 
this treaty, including labeling it “magna carta” or claiming that some of its 
 
37. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
38. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
39. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. 
40. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119. 
41. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21. 
42. The Moon Treaty is subscribed to by less than twenty States, none of which are the 
leading space-capable States. See Frans G. von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining: International and 













provisions constitute jus cogens.43 Others purport to “elevate” some of its pro-
visions to the status of customary international law;44 a shaky proposition 
given the absence of any meaningful State practice, especially by non-party 
States. Under scrutiny, the treaty reveals itself as merely a treaty of “princi-
ples,” as its title prescribes, drafted using broad language, lacking any en-
forcement mechanism, and allowing rapid, unconditional denunciation. 
These characteristics constitute part of the “context” for the purpose of in-
terpretation as provided for by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties45 and the application of an evolutionary interpretation of its generic 
terms.46  
Two additional treaties to consider are the Liability Convention and the 
Registration Convention. The latter imposes an obligation on States to reg-
ister the space objects they launch, while the former concerns standards of 
liability for damage caused to another State party. Although the Liability 
Convention provides for the establishment of a claims commission, its award 
is a recommendation to be considered in good faith, and it only becomes 
legally binding if the parties consent.47 As for registration, compliance by 
participants has been less than perfect.48 
In respect of space debris mitigation, these three treaties—but chiefly 
the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention—are cited for two some-
what interrelated issues: the obligation and the ramification. In basic terms, 
scholarship considers whether these treaties impose any obligations on 
 
43. See, e.g., Edwin W. Paxson III, Note, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration: 
Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 487, 
489 (1993); Ram S. Jakhu & Steven Freeland, The Relationship Between the Outer Space Treaty 
and Customary International Law, 59 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
SPACE LAW 183 (2016); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 73 (2d 
ed. 2018). 
44. See, e.g., RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MIN-
ERALS IN OUTER SPACE 154–55 (2012); Paul B. Larsen, Asteroid Legal Regime: Time for a 
Change, 39 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 289 (2014); Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 43, at 191–94. 
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
46. Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judg-
ment, 2009 I.C.J. 214, ¶ 66 (July 13). 
47. Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. XIX. 
48. See Priyank D. Doshi, Regulating the Final Frontier: Asteroid Mining and the Need for a 
New Regulatory Regime, 1 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE 
LAW 198, 205–6 (2016); Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani & Jonathan C. McDowell, Critical 
Issues Related to Registration of Space Objects and Transparency of Space Activities, 143 ACTA ASTRO-












States to mitigate space debris, and whether they prescribe responsibility or 
liability for any consequences resulting from failure to mitigate space de-
bris.49 The objective is to convince participants to reduce debris by imposing 
an obligation with a “stick” of liability attached. The complementary route 
concerns active debris removal and centers around the proposition that as 
States retain ownership of even the smallest pieces of debris, other States are 
precluded from deorbiting or otherwise interfering with or removing the de-
bris.50 Scholars then propose solutions to overcome this supposed hurdle 
through treaty interpretation or amendment.51 As this section will explain, 
such approaches are unconvincing and inconsistent with an evolving inter-
pretation and the principle of effet utile, and are unlikely to affect the decision-
making process of participants. 
Liability and responsibility under the space treaties are linked to the 
scope of the term “space object.” Current scholarship disagrees on whether 
space debris constitutes a space object52 under the treaties. The inclusion of 
“component parts” as space objects in Outer Space Treaty Articles VII and 
VIII and Liability Convention Article I is raised to justify considering all de-
bris, including pieces of paint or metal, to constitute space objects.53 Thus, 
the argument goes, the State launching or procuring the launch is liable for 
any damage caused by its debris to another State. Accordingly, the launching 
State is liable for all damage caused by debris on the Earth’s surface or to 
aircraft, while liability for damage in outer space is limited to proof of 
“fault.”54 In an attempt to overcome the limiting criterion of fault, some have 
 
49. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 272; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 236; Vi-
shakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 37; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 491. 
50. Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 243–44; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247; Larsen, 
Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 486, 518–19. 
51. See, e.g., Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 244–52; Joel A. Dennerley, State Liability 
for Space Object Collisions: The Proper Interpretation of “Fault” for the Purposes of International Space 
Law, 29 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (2018); Jakhu, Nyampong & 
Sgobba, supra note 28, at 131–32; Melissa K. Force, When the Nature and Duration of Space 
Becomes Appropriation: Use as a Legal Predicate for a State’s Objection to Active Debris Removal, 56 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 405 (2013). 
52. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 483; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 
388. 
53. See Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 235–38; Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 232–36; 
see also STUBBE, supra note 10, at 389. 












suggested lenient criteria for finding fault55 or even to dispense with it en-
tirely.56 This distinction, however, seems to be consistent with the realization 
that small debris in space is either unidentifiable or an uncontrollable by-
product of space activities, and, while these smaller pieces are likely to burn 
in the atmosphere, only large, and therefore easily identifiable, debris is likely 
to cause damage on the Earth’s surface or to aircraft. 
Scholarship needs to consider whether the inclusion of “all debris” under 
these rules is sensible, effective, or consistent with current realities. As this 
section will illustrate, to sway the policy choices of participants towards the 
optimum global order, it may be preferable to exclude, at the very least, small 




What obligations do States have under current law with regard to space de-
bris? Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty imposes a “due regard” standard 
on States. It is reasonable to conclude that this standard requires States to 
use their best efforts to mitigate the generation of space debris. However, 
the proposition that all debris generation must be avoided as “harmful con-
tamination” seems to stretch the term’s natural and ordinary meaning, which 
contains “biological, chemical or nuclear” elements, to cover an externality 
that causes mere obstruction or complication of use.58 While some activities, 
such as the testing of anti-satellite weapons, may generate debris to a level 
that constitutes “harmful interference with activities” of others, Article IX 
prescribes merely “consultation.” This suggests the softness of the intended 
degree of obligation vis-à-vis a disruptive element such as debris. 
 A best-efforts obligation is not only a textually reasonable interpretation 
of the treaty but is also consistent with the evolving context, including in-
creased private activities. The obligation to authorize and supervise private 
activities indicates that limiting sovereign obligations to best-efforts is sound 
and would not exceed States’ roles and capabilities. Given the anticipated 
growth in private activities, any higher degree of obligation is unlikely to gain 
support or compliance by space-capable States.  
 
55. See generally Dennerley, supra note 51; see also Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247.   
56. See Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 37. 
57. See Arpit Gupta, supra note 4, at 247; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 
1, at 486. 












The recently concluded Artemis Accords between the United States and 
its allied space-capable States are consistent with this interpretation. The Ac-
cords’ purpose is to “establish a common vision via a practical set of princi-
ples, guidelines and best practices.”59 With regard to space debris mitigations, 
the parties “commit to plan for the mitigation of orbital debris,”60 with their 
commitment to limit the generation of new debris confined “to the extent 
practicable,”61 which is a best-efforts obligation. Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that a best-efforts standard of obligation, while lower than some 
scholars would desire, constitutes a reasonable interpretation that is likely to 




Many scholars and commentators assume that “ownership” under the Outer 
Space Treaty somehow precludes an interested participant from actively re-
moving space debris.62 The proposition that without international law sanc-
tion a State lacks the right to remove destructive elements posing significant 
risks is an absurd result that may precipitate conflict, thus undermining the 
minimum order. But the application of such a rule lacks effet utile and under-
mines the legal maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,63 mandating its re-
consideration.  
Reisman explained that when considering international incidents, it is 
more important to evaluate the responses of elites in other States than 
whether the incidents constitute a violation of a rule. Rather than reacting to 
incidents “in judgmental fashion, assuming that the norm in question is a 
priori and enduring,”64 it is more important to evaluate “the reactions of other 
relevant actors and, through those reactions, the subjective conceptions of 
 
59. Artemis Accords, supra note 29, § 1. 
60. Id. § 12(1). 
61. Id. § 12(2). 
62. See, e.g., Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 486, 518–19; Muñoz-
Patchen, supra note 28, at 246; Jakhu, Nyampong & Sgobba, supra note 28, at 131–33; Arpit 
Gupta, supra note 4, at 238–41. 
63. On this principle see Jutta Brunnée, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [Use your own 
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another], MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (last updated Mar. 2010), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/ 
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right and/or tolerable behavior entertained by those other actors.”65 As-
sume, arguendo, that the United States decided to conduct or authorize a mis-
sion to remove small and unidentifiable debris from orbit. The potential re-
sponses from other space-capable participants to whom the debris might 
“belong” include silence, support, emulation, protest, or retaliation.66 It 
should be evident that the prospect of retaliation is unlikely, yet it propels 
scholars to consider the regime of ownership as a legal obstacle. 
Should a participant decide to retaliate by initiating a dispute settlement 
procedure, the first hurdle would be to establish jurisdiction, as the Outer 
Space Treaty lacks such a mechanism. As for the International Court of Jus-
tice, even if jurisdiction could be established, an adverse judgment or opinion 
is improbable and, even then, unproductive. It is a leap to assume that the 
prospect of a decision mandating cessation or advising of prospective repa-
rations would deter a participant from removing the debris.  
Regardless of whether it would even be possible to prove ownership of 
a piece of debris that was pushed into the atmosphere and burned, rendering 
it unidentifiable, it is unlikely that a participant will expend the resources 
necessary to sustain such a claim for limited gain. First, active removal of 
debris lends itself to the defense of “necessity” as an activity safeguarding an 
essential interest with minimal effects on the “owner.”67 Although necessity 
commands a high threshold,68 it is a sensible proposition. But the exclusion 
of wrongfulness does not prejudice the “question of compensation for any 
material loss caused by the act.”69 Thus, irrespective of wrongfulness, such a 
tribunal award could include reparations. Exploring this remedy, however, 
exposes a deeper flaw. 
Economist Alexander Salter attaches value to existing debris, based on 
the costs and efforts of launching an equivalent mass of it into orbit, pro-
posing that such material may therefore be valuable to the owners.70 This, 
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69. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 27(b), U.N. Doc. 
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however, disregards the costs associated with collecting those fragments and 
reprocessing them for use, rendering the actual value of the debris owned by 
each participant quite unclear. In our scenario, the owner of the debris will 
then be required to expend resources to prove to a tribunal the value of the 
debris, which will be the compensation—the reparation—owed by our 
“Good Samaritan” State. Irrespective of the futility of trying to prove the 
value of small and unidentifiable pieces of debris, the perceived costs and 
minimal benefits involved suggest that States are unlikely to resort to such 
procedures. This renders the probability of the threat of a dispute settlement 
process affecting the decision-making process quite imaginary.  
The same analysis applies to the likelihood of retaliation through a coun-
termeasure. A retaliatory violation must be proportional.71 Because the value 
of the debris to the owner is small and intangible, any countermeasure will 
be limited in scope.  
Additionally, attempts to stop the internationally beneficial collection of 
space debris may result in negative public opinion, including criticism or lob-
bying from environmental activists, space entrepreneurs, or even the general 
public.72 Interestingly, Russia and China have indicated that interference with 
their space objects may count as an act of aggression.73 The scope and cir-
cumstances of their claims are unclear, and it is likewise unclear if they were 
referring to space debris. Furthermore, it seems unrealistic to suggest that 
Russia would go to war, employ trade instruments, or position nuclear weap-
ons in space because the United States removed Russian debris.  
It is technology and cost-effectiveness,74 not governing international law, 
that precludes active debris removal. Once debris removal becomes cost-
effective, a participant will execute it regardless of any purported ownership. 
Such a conclusion is stronger for small and unidentifiable fragments. The 
inclusion of all debris as “component parts” of “space objects” is simply 
inconsistent with an evolutionary interpretation and the principle of effet utile.  
 
 
71. On countermeasures, see generally the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra 
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72. While public opinion’s effect on Russian policy is limited, China considers its global 
image important. See, e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison & Tom Phillips, China Hopes “Vaccine 
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73. STUBBE, supra note 10, at 365. 
74. See Adilov et al., supra note 20, at 94, 95; STUBBE, supra note 10, at 58–59; Salter, 














As mentioned above, some scholars propose that space-capable States 
should mitigate their production of debris or even remove debris they have 
already produced because they may be held liable for any damage the debris 
cause. This proposition does not withstand scrutiny.  
Even assuming that the owner could be identified and, when relevant, 
fault proven, for a rule of liability to affect policy choices it must be accom-
panied by procedural rights for its enforcement, which are absent from cur-
rent international rules. The Outer Space Treaty does not provide such 
rights, and under the Liability Convention, the owner must choose to com-
pensate the affected party for damages75 because any claims commission’s 
award is legally binding only by choice.76 Moreover, the vagueness of the 
terms may be employed to argue against the scope of liability, as the Soviet 
Union did following the crash of a Soviet satellite with a radioactive power 
source in Canada.77 Finally, a commission may find it difficult to render a 
decision should the parties fail to agree on the applicable law.78  
The absurdity of this “stick” is further exposed when one considers a 
collision in space resulting in—or caused by—unidentifiable or untraceable 
pieces of debris.79 It is unclear whether a post-accident analysis could even 
deduce the responsible owner of the debris. Even if a piece of debris is iden-
tifiable, the owner State would only be liable if the collision, detected and 
proved, was its fault, an ambiguous criterion requiring that a participant pro-
duce evidence to sustain it. In addition to the resources required to sustain a 
claim, an injured participant incurs potential political costs associated with 
the inter-State dispute settlement process. The effects of a dispute could spill 
over and undermine cooperation in other aspects of inter-State relations, 
such as investment, trade, or scientific exchange. 
Absent procedural rights and given the low value of the debris, the ram-
ification of liability proposed by some scholars to motivate States to reduce 
debris is a paper tiger. It is unlikely to affect policy choices precisely because 
the risk of retaliatory action by an injured participant is extremely low. This 
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77. Roth, supra note 75, at 846. 
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again indicates that an interpretation of space object as including all pieces 
of debris lacks effet utile. An evolutionary and reasonable interpretation of the 
space treaties would exclude small and untraceable pieces of debris from the 
definition of space object and perhaps exclude even identifiable yet inoper-
able and unsalvageable objects. 
  
2. Non-Legally Binding International Instruments 
 
The corpus of international law includes non-legally binding instruments and 
soft laws that affect the decision-making process of participants.80 Scholars 
have referred to some of these instruments, including General Assembly res-
olutions, as indicating opinio juris, which, if followed, would even generate 
State practice.81 Yet, practice consistent with a recommendation may stem 
from its non-legally binding character rather than constitute an indication 
that compliance is due to an instrument’s perceived legally binding nature.  
Non-legally binding instruments relevant to space debris include General 
Assembly resolutions82 and general guidelines adopted by the United Na-
tions Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the 
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).83 The guide-
lines adopted by COPUOS are based on those of the IADC, which is an 
informal intergovernmental organization for cooperation between the space 
agencies of space-capable States.84  
Both sets of guidelines were intentionally adopted as voluntary recom-
mendations, and States have adopted laws implementing them in varying de-
grees of conformity.85 Their implementation is imperfect, and participants 
diverge from them due to conflicting objectives and interests, which may 
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BENVENISTI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE]. See also Steven Freeland, The Role of “Soft Law” in 
Public International Law and its Relevance to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, in SOFT 
LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SPACE LAW 9, 19 (Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012). 
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include the reduction of regulatory burdens to facilitate the development of 
private industry. Some authors have suggested that when States follow the 
guidelines, this may generate State practice establishing customary interna-
tional law, transforming the obligation to mitigate debris into binding inter-
national law.86 Similarly, it is suggested that the mere failure to comply with 
the guidelines may constitute fault for the purpose of establishing liability.87 
Such approaches, however, ignore the rules governing the identification of 
customary international law. 
The International Court of Justice and the International Law Commis-
sion (ILC) have stressed that a rule of customary international law may 
emerge from the general, actual practice by States, which they perceive as 
required by law (“opinio juris”).88 While practice by a few participants could 
be sufficient,89 when rules originating in treaties are concerned, it is primarily 
the practice of non-parties that is indicative of the relevant State practice.90 
This makes sense because practice by State-parties consistent with a treaty 
may simply indicate compliance with treaty obligations.91 Such considera-
tions apply with equal or greater strength to a provision of an intentionally 
non-legally binding instrument.  
Recently, the ILC adopted its recommendations for the identification of 
customary international law based on the report of Sir Michael Wood.92 Con-
clusion 12 stipulates that while resolutions of international organizations, in 
themselves, do not generate customary international law, they may “contrib-
ute to its development.”93 However, the ILC also stressed that “regard must 
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be had to the overall context,”94 and State practice “must be sufficiently 
widespread and representative, as well as consistent.”95 Where “the practice 
of a particular State varies,” the ILC explains that “the weight to be given to 
that practice may, depending on the circumstances, be reduced.”96 
These understandings obviate the possibility that the guidelines reflect 
customary international law. The COPUOS guidelines were adopted for 
“voluntary” implementation, “to the greatest extent feasible” by member 
States.97 Absent any meaningful and actual practice by non-parties, a claim 
of general State practice is unconvincing. Furthermore, given that implemen-
tation of the guidelines varies among States, practice is inconsistent. Criti-
cally, the context of the guidelines adoption and their voluntary nature un-
dermine any proposition that their implementation is “undertaken with a 
sense of legal . . . obligation.”98  
The guidelines, however, constitute an important element of the inter-
national lawmaking process. When sufficiently internalized by space-capable 
States,99 these norms are anticipated to internationalize, driving the develop-
ment of international law both in the sense of best practices and perhaps 
even rules.100 As mentioned above, evidence for such internationalization 
can be found in the Artemis Accords.  
 
3. Indirect International Rules 
 
States’ policy choices concerning debris mitigation are also shaped through 
indirect rules, providing avenues to facilitate the optimum global order. This 
section evaluates the degree to which international environmental law and 
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i. International Environmental Law 
 
Many authors turn to international environmental law when considering 
global governance of space debris.101 Although for policymakers space debris 
is mainly a traffic management problem, international environmental law in-
cludes several sets of rules and principles that may affect decisions. Critically, 
the international community must appreciate that any rules for mitigating 
space debris must be balanced with the mitigation of another international 
externality: greenhouse gas emissions. 
The “polluter pays” principle has been suggested as an indication that 
space-capable States should bear the brunt of the costs of mitigation efforts, 
because they are responsible for most past and current debris.102 Others have 
raised the precautionary principle as a source of obligations, based on the 
notion that States have a general obligation to “take preventive measures to 
protect the environment.”103 The core idea of this principle “is to prevent 
environmental harm in advance, even when full scientific certainty about a 
threat does not exist,”104 thus imposing a preventative “due diligence” obli-
gation depending on a State’s capabilities.105 But, as Lotta Viikari explains, 
the application of the precautionary principle under international law is chal-
lenging given that both its flexibility and generality are made worse in in-
stances of scientific uncertainty and ambiguous risks.106 With respect to 
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space debris, Viikari notes that applying the precautionary principle may re-
quire costly solutions, making its adoption “a complicated endeavor.”107 
Guidance may be found in the ILC’s draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.108 The Articles establish a 
due diligence obligation for States when approving activities which “involve 
a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical con-
sequences.”109 The ILC explains that a “State likely to be affected” can be 
more than one State and includes places under any State’s jurisdiction or 
control.110 Therefore, arguably, transboundary harm should, in principle, ex-
tend to include risks to space objects. While the ILC recognized that it “can-
not forecast all possible future forms of ‘transboundary harm,’ ”111 it did, 
however, point out the need to distinguish between affected and affecting 
States.112 “[D]rawing a clear line,” as the ILC desires, may not be practical 
for space debris as it affects all participants, including the State of origin, 
whether immediately or in the future, subject to their adaptation capabilities. 
Nevertheless, the ILC Articles signal the appreciation that States must 
conduct an “assessment of transboundary harm” of a potentially harmful 
activity prior to authorization, including “any environmental impact assess-
ment.”113 In 2015, the International Court of Justice recognized an “obliga-
tion to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary envi-
ronmental harm,”114 with substantive obligations that resemble the Arti-
cles.115 
Both the ILC Articles and the International Court of Justice’s Construction 
of a Road judgment impose obligations of conduct rather than of result with 
respect to transboundary harm. In operative terms, States are only required 
to notify and consult prior to authorizing hazardous activities, but are not 
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prohibited from authorizing them.116 Nevertheless, they are required to take 
“all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at 
any event to minimize the risk thereof,”117 while considering “the importance 
of the activity,”118 “the availability of means of preventing,”119 and the pro-
spect of “carrying out the activity . . . by other means.”120 The ILC also added 
the need to consider “the standards of prevention . . . applied in comparable 
regional or international practice.”121 In the case of space debris, these may 
extend to include the COPUOS guidelines. 
Although it may be beneficial to have States perform environmental im-
pact assessments when the risk may extend to the entire international com-
munity, the process requires actions directed at specific affected States. 
While the ILC may be justified in extending the obligation to installations of 
other States on the high seas, extending it to ships122 that may be randomly 
affected presents difficulties in implementation. The situation in space is 
even more challenging because debris, once created, continues to exist in 
orbit and is likely to affect future participants. The proposition that space-
capable States need not only take the interests of stakeholders into account, 
but must also assess possible transboundary and future effects, or provide 
notification and consultation to all States, is excessive and impractical given 
the instability of risks and changing affected parties.  
One caveat is important. In a forthcoming article, Professors Donald 
Elliott and Daniel Esty propose to reconsider the theory of environmental 
externalities, suggesting to shift governance towards the internalization of all 
externalities, which they frame as an “end of externalities.”123 According to 
their approach, “all residual pollution that remains after the application of 
technologically feasible pollution controls must bear a harm charge that 
compensates as fully as is possible those subject to the ongoing emissions,” 
in order to affect decisions towards “zero emissions goals.”124 They recog-
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nize that “concessions to practicality and feasibility” will be required but sug-
gest that technological innovation will reduce the tradeoffs.125 Although their 
approach is founded on individual harm and “a right to a healthy environ-
ment,”126 which somewhat limits its application to a traffic management 
problem such as space debris, should this approach be adopted as a guiding 
principle of international environmental law, both the Articles of Trans-
boundary Harm and the correlating obligations of States, will require recon-
sideration. 
Even absent any mandatory assessment of transboundary harm, the ILC 
Articles may indicate that any State planning space activities must consider 
using available mitigation capabilities as a matter of principle. This should, 
of course, be balanced with the potential level of harm and benefits of the 
space activity, which, for many developing States, could be significant. Fi-
nally, any international regulation for the mitigation of space debris must 
take account of, and be affected by, the international rules and principles 
directed at the climate change crisis. These include, inter alia, the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities”127 and the commitments in the 
Paris Agreement to increase the mitigation of emissions.128 Although space 
debris is not an emission on its own, rules governing space debris mitigation 
should facilitate, and be balanced with, the obligations to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and adapt to climate change. It is thus important to appreciate 
that while space activities promote the ability of participants to adapt to and 
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, space launches generate sig-
nificant emissions.129 The urgency of adequately responding to the climate 
change crisis, through both adaptation and mitigation, indicates that the in-
ternational community must balance the costs and benefits of space activities 
not only in the sense of debris but also in the sense of emissions.  
Furthermore, in confronting climate change, space-based geoengineer-
ing efforts constitute an important instrument to achieving the public policy 
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objective.130 Whether or not such endeavors are realized must also depend 
on their potential impact on space debris. In correlation, the urgency of con-
fronting climate change may justify the increased generation of debris. Space 
debris mitigation would thus be affected by international rules and practices 
concerning climate change.  
 
ii. International Investment Law 
 
International investment law governs the relations between States and for-
eign investors. It includes historical elements of public international law con-
cerning diplomatic protection of nationals and minimum standards of treat-
ment, human rights law, and a myriad of over three thousand investment 
protection treaties. Although treaties may be formulated differently, the in-
vestment protection regime includes certain repeating themes intended to 
promote and protect foreign investments. These elements include not only 
substantiative protections for investors from measures adopted by host-
States but also procedural rights, ranging from access to domestic courts to 
legally binding State consent to international arbitration. In broad terms, 
these rules are intended to create favorable terms for cross-border invest-
ment and provide investors protections from political decisions taken by the 
host-State to their detriment.131 As private space activities gain momentum, 
international investment law may play a part in the governance of any cross-
border space-related investment.   
The increase in private space activities risks instigating a circular interna-
tional process of reduced regulatory burdens described as a “regulatory race 
to the bottom.”132 The possibility of this spiral effect stems from a potential 
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flag of convenience problem in outer space activities,133 emulating an en-
demic problem in maritime shipping.134 Space-incapable States may adopt 
regulations to attract foreign investors as a means of participating in the new 
Space Age. Such an approach was adopted in Luxemburg, which has suc-
cessfully attracted foreign investors to establish domestic operations by fol-
lowing the United States in recognizing property rights to space resources,135 
a proposition disputed by others, including Russia.136 Increased ability to dis-
connect from terrestrial domains enables space investors to shift their oper-
ations to a State that offers favorable terms, such as reduced labor costs, a 
higher share of profits, and reduced safety and debris regulations to decrease 
costs. Investors and potential host-States may be incentivized to increase the 
generation of space debris in the short term, discounting potential future 
costs associated with higher levels of debris in orbit. As many State partici-
pants have incentives to attract investors, this situation risks turning into that 
regulatory race to the bottom. 
It has been argued that international investment protection for space ac-
tivities will encourage space investments in space-incapable States.137 This 
sensible assumption leads to the conclusion that the rights and protections 
offered by investment treaties will exacerbate, indirectly, the problem of de-
bris because (1) the investment protection system is widespread and mainly 
founded on the bilateral model;138 (2) the effects of debris in space, rather 
than on the Earth, are subject to the supervision and fault-based liability of 
States; and (3) in a flag of convenience situation, space activities may be gov-
erned under the laws of a State offering lenient regulations, while, in fact, 
operating and being controlled from an entirely different location. With in-
teractions occurring in these situations, the regulatory race to the bottom 
may be fueled by the investment protection system. 
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Various protections offered by investment treaties, such as legitimate ex-
pectations or an agreement on regulatory stability, may impose hurdles on 
developing States wishing to alleviate the international externality by increas-
ing their regulatory requirements. Tribunals may disregard international con-
siderations and limit themselves to the case at bar.139 Thus, even if, from an 
international perspective, increased debris mitigation standards are welcome, 
a tribunal may still find a State in violation of an investment treaty. Although 
it is unclear whether or how much of a “chilling effect” this may precipitate, 
the possibility of such an effect indicates that international investment law 
plays a part in any global efforts to mitigate space debris. 
 
III. PARTICIPANTS AND VALUES  
 
Global governance for space debris mitigation must be attuned to the goals 
and interests of the relevant participants: it must be feasible, effective, and 
manageable. A regime’s feasibility can be measured by reference to the par-
ticipants involved, their bases of power, objectives, and the outcomes of 
their anticipated interactions in the specific circumstances. Effectiveness de-
pends on a given regime’s ability to optimize the gain in values for all partic-
ipants; manageability turns upon the situations in which the interactions tran-
spire and upon the strategies the participants choose.140 
To properly evaluate any proposed rules and postulate the anticipated 
evolution of the regime, this section outlines the international values partic-
ipants will utilize and the regime must optimize, and then considers the rel-
evant participants and their goals and interests as they relate to the optimi-
zation of values. Given the limited international rules in place, considering 
the “responses of key actors to . . . critical event[s],”141 as Reisman explained, 
is essential for ascertaining the interactions that will develop the regime.  
 
A. International Values  
 
Although their content may evolve as space activities increase and global 
governance responds and develops further, the currently relevant interna-
tional values are (1) wealth, (2) skill or innovation, (3) equity, (4) security, (5) 
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health and safety, (6) human dignity, and (7) environmental protection.142 
This section will briefly review these values in relation to space debris.  
 
1. Wealth  
 
Outer space activities both require and generate wealth. Space capabilities 
provide many advantages to States, including communication, geolocation, 
espionage, military command and control, urban planning, medical research, 
and more.143 But developing space capabilities, either privately or publicly, 
requires significant capital for the development and acquisition of expertise, 
infrastructure construction, and personnel training.144 In the past, the signif-
icant investment required, high risk, and minimal returns led to activities be-
ing funded primarily by governments for scientific knowledge, prestige, and 
security.145 This pattern is changing.  
The satellite industry was privatized due to its ability to generate reve-
nue.146 Currently, the potential gains in wealth generate private investment 
in other aspects of space activities, including tourism, launches, military, and, 
perhaps, resources.147 The anticipated gains in wealth drive decision-making 
processes and, subsequently, the development of international law. In re-
spect of space debris mitigation, anticipated interactions indicate that wealth 
produces conflicting effects on policy choices. 
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The implementation of mitigation efforts increases the costs of space 
projects. Thus, any participant able to avoid or decrease their implementa-
tion of mitigation will potentially increase its gain in wealth.148 A tragedy of 
the commons ensues: each participant is incentivized to generate debris as 
the externality’s effects spread between all participants.149 But the adverse 
effects of space debris on the costs associated with all participants’ access to 
space, the safety of personnel, and protection of property, might offset gains 
from reduced mitigation efforts. Therefore, the increased consequence for 
major users generates incentives for them to self-mitigate.150 Emerging State 
and private participants may, however, discount future risk and prioritize 
immediate gains, given their lower overall exposure to accidents.  
Increased susceptibility to outliers, as with high seas fishing and climate 
change, indicates that the manageability of any international regulation for 
debris mitigation turns upon generating incentives for participants to mod-
erate immediate gains in wealth in exchange for future ones. The effective-
ness of any potential international regulation thus turns upon its ability to 
command universality, which imposes difficulties on the feasibility due to 
the need to achieve consensus. 
 
2. Skill or Innovation 
 
Wealth and innovation are interdependent. Wealth drives and enables inno-
vation, and innovation generates wealth. Therefore, it is reasonable to as-
sume that for most space activities, the gap between space-capable and 
space-incapable States could grow exponentially, as the former acquire more 
wealth from providing services and accessing resources to fuel their private 
and public innovation.151 Coupled with the significant benefits of space ac-
tivities, these prospects generate a strong incentive for emerging participants 
to accelerate their development of space capabilities without concern for the 
debris generated in the process.  
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Innovation increases debris generation by certain participants, yet debris 
mitigation is essential by and for all participants. Recently, SpaceX tested a 
launcher that landed back on the Earth rather than burning up in the atmos-
phere or remaining in orbit.152 Similarly, other technological developments 
to reduce debris have been developed and adopted, as States implement the 
guidelines.153 Policymakers must also appreciate the fact that innovation, 
through identification, tracking, and protection from debris, allows partici-
pants to adapt to the externality and reduce the cost-effectiveness of mitiga-
tion. But by reducing some participants’ need for mitigation, innovation may 
undermine the goals and interests of other participants. 
States may be incentivized to invest in innovation to enable and protect 
their operations to increase domestic gain in all values. Investors, however, 
will invest in mitigation and adaptation technology only as far as it corre-
sponds with gains in wealth. For investors, predictability is essential. Thus, 
any global regime must secure, to a reasonable extent, investors’ ability to 
innovate and protect their investments. Unclear and changing rules on debris 
mitigation may disincentivize investors, while strict rules limiting innovation 
risk incentivizing the relocation of space operations to less stringent jurisdic-




Claims of equity come from all types of participants but predominantly from 
developing countries. Such claims affect the development of international 
law. Myres McDougal and his co-authors emphasized that “space resources 
could serve . . . as a great ‘equalizer’ between different territorial communi-
ties.”154 But for space and its resources to truly “equalize” communities, a 
regime must be attuned to the goals and interests of all participants, including 
equity claims. Although items of space debris are not “resources” in the com-
mon sense, the increase in debris undermines the capability of participants 
to use all other resources of space, including valuable orbits.155  
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Claims for equity in debris mitigation and adaptation rest on the fact that 
most existing debris originates from activities conducted by space-capable 
States in the process of developing their skills.156 But space-incapable States 
wishing to develop their own skills and industries will have to resist rules that 
increase their debris mitigation obligations to a level that undermines their 
ability to develop space capabilities.157 Equity claims, therefore, include calls 
to prescribe for an equitable distribution of responsibility for mitigating the 
space debris problem while preserving the ability of participants to increase 
debris for the development of domestic industries.158 For any international 
rules to command the universality required to reduce outlier behavior, the 
regime must implement elements of equity, which may take the form of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities, either internationally or through na-
tional discretion.  
In the past, developing countries have combined claims for equity with 
requests for technology sharing and financial assistance. The development 
of the law of the sea demonstrates that if such claims are directed at imposing 
preconditions on access to natural resources, they are likely to face significant 
opposition.159 However, were such claims limited to mitigation and adapta-
tion capabilities, they may be acceptable to developed States, as evident from 
the compromises reached in the efforts to confront climate change.160 
Space-capable States may be more receptive to calls for sharing mitiga-
tion technology rather than adaptation technology, which may also have mil-
itary and security aspects. It is worth recalling that domestic and international 
regulations impose costs on participants, thus encouraging the investment 
of capital for developing cost-reducing technological solutions. If all partici-
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pants shared and implemented mitigation technologies, the demand for fur-
ther technological innovation would be reduced. Investors, however, are un-




National security infrastructures of many States, predominantly space-capa-
ble States, rely heavily on space activities. These security interests will be 
jeopardized should the rate of debris generation exceed States’ adaptation 
capabilities, thus increasing the potential for accidents. This equilibrium 
would affect less developed participants more than developed ones due to 
their different abilities to employ wealth and innovation. The increased ad-
aptation capabilities of space-capable States indicate that security-related 
claims will only marginally affect the development of international law at the 
initial stage. But they will take an increasingly central role if debris prolifera-
tion exceeds their adaptation capabilities. 
The proliferation of space debris not only threatens to adversely affect 
security interests but may precipitate conflict due to increased accidents and 
associated costs. The limited ability to prove fault or responsibility consti-
tutes an obvious caveat to such a proposition, undermining the prospect of 
any tangible disputes stemming from debris, and especially very small frag-
ments. The crash of the Soviet satellite in Canada was settled without dis-
pute,161 and while the testing of anti-satellite weapons by China and India has 
generated protest,162 it did not culminate in international disputes. However, 
there is no guarantee that space debris will not generate disputes in the future 
that jeopardize security.  
Increased private activities may further escalate security concerns given 
the reduced ability of States to exercise control. In addition, the current as-
signment of jurisdiction and responsibility indicates that disputes over dam-
age between investors, and perhaps between investors and States, may be-
come international if and when insurance no longer provides adequate pro-
tection.163 As will be further elaborated below, the allocation of jurisdiction, 
 
161. Roth, supra note 75, at 845–46. 
162. SHIRLEY KAN, CONG. RCSH. SERV., RS22652, CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE 
WEAPON TEST 1–2 (2007); Helen Regan, India Anti-Satellite Missile Test a “Terrible Thing,” 
NASA Chief Says, CNN (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/india/nasa-
india-anti-missile-test-intl/index.html.   
163. See Salter, supra note 1, at 230–32; Paul B. Larsen, Does New Space Require New 












responsibility, and liability under the current international rules is somewhat 
inappropriate given the current and anticipated interactions. The potential 
engagement at the inter-State level may further generate claims to alter such 
rules either through modification or interpretation. 
 
5. Health and Safety 
 
All claims for increased mitigation rest upon the need to protect the safety 
of space crews and property. Accidents may bring about increased adverse 
effects on health, especially should radioactive components be damaged.164 
Furthermore, health is promoted through space activities, such as medical 
research, remote sensing, environmental efforts, and more.165 Allowing acci-
dents to undermine these vital space capabilities would adversely affect 
health and safety on the ground as well.  
On the other hand, while debris mitigation is primarily intended to pro-
mote safety and health, overly strict mitigation rules could discourage space 
activities meant to promote domestic gains in these values. Therefore, the 
global regime must balance the risks to health and safety in space with do-
mestic benefits in health and safety from increased space activities. 
 
6. Human Dignity 
 
For any global debris mitigation regime to attain universality it should pro-
mote human dignity as well as equity. This means that in addition to pro-
moting the human rights of space personnel and terrestrial employees, uni-
versality will turn on a regime’s ability to win wide participation in both its 
foundation and implementation, rather than being dictated by certain partic-
ipants. “An instrumental goal of a public order of human dignity is of course 
the equipping of all individuals for full participation in authoritative deci-
sion.”166 Such claims may be supplemented by claims to prevent a demo-
cratic deficit from top-down international regulation.167   
The regime’s foundation must extend to include as many participants in 
the decision-making process as is feasible. The increased prospects of outlier 
behavior indicate that international command and control is neither feasible 
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nor advisable, and the prospects for convening a parliamentary diplomatic 
arena to produce an instrument by majority vote are quite low. Rather, any 
international regime must be based on cooperation, be adopted by consen-
sus, recognize and appreciate participants’ specific goals and interests, and 
be dynamic in allowing them to optimize domestic and international values.  
 
7. Environmental Protection 
  
As mentioned above, the promotion of environmental protection may con-
flict with debris mitigation, as outer space activities provide essential tools 
for combating domestic environmental concerns and their adverse effects, 
primarily climate change and natural disasters.168 It is, therefore, essential to 
recognize that promoting such objectives may outweigh the adverse effects 
of increased space debris and its associated costs. International rules must 
balance the need to protect the Earth’s environment and ensure the viability 
of space operations.  
 
B. Participants  
 
Modern global governance presents increased complexity and a multiplicity 
of participants. As far as the regulation of space debris is concerned, States 
continue to play a central role, but the participation of private and public-
private entities is gaining momentum.169 This section will review the various 
participants involved in the process of shaping international rules for space 
debris mitigation, their goals, and interests.  
 
1. Space-Capable States 
 
International rules governing the mitigation of space debris will be predom-
inantly shaped through the interactions of space-capable States and thus will 
be attuned to their goals and interests. These participants are, and will likely 
remain, the major military and economic powers. Although the centrality of 
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their goals and interests for the feasibility of any global order is self-evi-
dent,170 their interests are contradictory, making the governance of space de-
bris complex for these States.  
Most space debris production originates from activities conducted by 
space-capable States, predominantly the United States and Russia.171 Besides 
space operations, in recent years the testing of anti-satellite weapons has 
emerged as a source for space debris. Weapons testing by China and India 
disseminated large quantities of small but dangerous pieces of debris,172 and 
recently the United States criticized Russia for conducting a “non-destruc-
tive” anti-satellite weapons test in orbit.173 The international criticism of 
China’s anti-satellite weapons test did not discourage India from executing 
its own test, indicating that other participants may develop and test such 
weapons to counterbalance these States.  
The evolution of the regime governing the atmospheric testing of nu-
clear weapons174 may assist in assessing the likely trajectory for global gov-
ernance of anti-satellite weapons testing. Like atmospheric testing, the test-
ing of anti-satellite weapons in space produces significant adverse economic, 
medical, and environmental effects on the rights and interests of other par-
ticipants. But the prohibition on atmospheric testing only emerged after the 
major participants acquired the necessary capabilities through testing. Even 
then, the prohibition was drafted in a manner that allowed a participant to 
deviate from the regime on short notice.175 Although the International Court 
of Justice attempted to impose the prohibition on France, a non-Party to the 
1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,176 it eventually backed down due to both 
France’s refusal to abide by its preliminary injunction and its statement that 
it would discontinue atmospheric testing, “in the normal course of 
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events.”177 It is thus reasonable to conclude that while the testing of anti-
satellite weapons generates adverse effects, the consent of major powers to 
halting such tests is improbable until those powers perfect their capabilities. 
It is interesting, however, to ponder whether, at such a time, a conditional 
prohibition may be installed due to the adverse effects of debris generation. 
With the vast majority of space activities in the near future conducted by 
space-capable States and their citizens, they arguably bear the heaviest expo-
sure to the costs associated with increased space debris.178 But this proposi-
tion is over simplified. Given the importance of outer space to their security 
and economy, these States have much to lose from the proliferation of space 
debris. But they also possess vast wealth and innovation capabilities, increas-
ing their capacity to adapt to adverse effects short of total devastation, the 
timetables and potential of which are unclear. Thus, their potential risk is 
offset by increased skills. 
Still, space-capable States realize the potential adverse effects of space 
debris on their interests, as is evident from the adoption of the IADC guide-
lines179 and their internalization through domestic law.180 But the incon-
sistency in application and compliance implies that other interests affect pol-
icy choices. Space-capable States are anticipated to continue promoting the 
development of economically viable private or public space industries.181 
Thus, for them, any rules on debris mitigation must refrain from undermin-
ing such objectives. The Artemis Accords,182 for instance, illustrate that 
space-capable States prefer to coordinate the development of the space in-
dustry and debris mitigation between themselves through consortiums rather 
than on an international scale. However, because space-capable States have 
 
177. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶¶ 23–60 (Dec. 20); W. 
Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAL MEETING 101, 117–19 (1981).  
178. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 496; Muñoz-Patchen, supra 
note 28, at 257; Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 177–78. 
179. See SPD-3, supra note 3. 
180. See, e.g., id.; see also Muñoz-Patchen, supra note 28, at 241. 
181. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Reforming and Modernizing American 
Commercial Space Policy, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 24, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-reforming-modernizing-ameri-
can-commercial-space-policy/ [hereinafter U.S. Space Policy Directive 2]; INNOVATION FI-
NANCE ADVISORY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SPACE SECTOR 
(Report prepared for the European Commission, 2018), https://www.eib.org/attach-
ments/thematic/future_of_european_space_sector_summary_en.pdf.  












different levels of industrial development and capabilities to avoid debris,183 
their interests may vary accordingly.  
In addition, increased private participation in space activities may incen-
tivize space-capable States to settle questions of liability and responsibility, 
propelling the establishment of an international dispute resolution mecha-
nism to increase foreseeability.184 Besides safeguarding investments, as space 
tourism increases, space-capable States will also aspire to install rules which 
increase the protection of their populations from potential accidents. As 
public entities, space-capable States may also promote debris mitigation as 
an environmental concern due to public or political pressure. 
 
2. Space-Incapable States and States Developing Capabilities  
 
Although States currently lacking space capabilities and those actively devel-
oping space-capabilities may have varied goals, interests, and leverages, their 
similarities justify treating them as a single group: space-incapable States. As 
with space-capable States, these participants possess similar interests con-
cerning the protection of their populations and the environment but have 
different interests relating to the imposition of debris mitigation obligations. 
As evident from recent discussions at the United Nations Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, space-incapable States aspire to install a 
regime of common but differentiated responsibilities for the mitigation of 
space debris.185 This claim of equity is based on three elements: (1) these 
participants are not responsible for the debris generated thus far by space-
capable States; (2) imposing strict rules would undermine their capability to 
develop their own space industries and gain the associated benefits in other 
values; and (3) as they possess less developed adaptation capabilities, debris 
proliferation presents higher risks for them than for space-capable States.186 
This echoes a well-known conundrum from global efforts to mitigate green-
house gas emissions.187 Although this article will further develop the analogy 
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later,188 it is important for purposes of this section to realize the conflicting 
and complex interests of space-incapable States regarding space debris miti-
gation efforts.  
The development of space capabilities is essential for developing coun-
tries189 as it promotes wealth and innovation from public and private endeav-
ors.190 Moreover, because developing countries are disproportionately ex-
posed to the adverse effects of climate change,191 the benefits in mitigation 
and adaptation offered through space technology192 promote domestic envi-
ronmental interests, health, safety, and wealth. The significant gain in values 
for space-incapable States that stems from developing a space industry will 
be counterbalanced by international values and the potential risks to their 
domestic values from increased costs associated with debris.  
Thus, space-incapable States aspire to install a regime that enables their 
development of space capabilities while limiting the generation of debris by 
current space-capable States. Some space-incapable States may, however, 
prioritize short-term gains over future costs resulting in higher levels of de-
bris generation.193 Although less likely at this point in time, accidents could 
lead to setbacks with dire results for these States due to their limited re-
sources.194 Therefore, emerging participants with reduced abilities to develop 
their own space capabilities are likely to attract space investors through reg-
ulatory benefits. As such, given the likelihood that high levels of debris will 
be generated in developing their space industries, emerging participants have 
an interest in retaining the nationally based, non-legally binding structure of 
the international order and the limited regime of liability. However, the more 
capabilities a State acquires, the more it will appreciate the risks posed by 
space debris. 
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In contrast to the case of space-resources,195 space-incapable States pos-
sess certain leverage vis-à-vis space-capable States with respect to debris mit-
igation. An increasing number of States, including developing countries, cur-
rently have, or are developing, capabilities to launch satellites to the various 
Earth orbits.196 In addition, allocating territory for the construction of a 
launching facility by a foreign investor requires little effort or technical ex-
pertise. Because space-incapable States can increase the externality with 
which the mitigation regime is concerned, their interests and goals will re-




Space entrepreneurs not only generate space debris but also affect the policy 
choices of States. As the case of space resources demonstrated, investors can 
influence legislation adopted by their States.197 With private activities lying at 
the core of the United States’ future space policy and strategy,198 the interests 
of private industry will likely sound in both its policy choices and in any 
international rules to be agreed upon. 
Investors will likely lay claims to maximize their gain in wealth and inno-
vation at the expense of environmental protection, equity, health, and secu-
rity. They will lobby for international rules which maximize their ability to 
conduct space operations at minimal costs. Some have suggested that given 
the potential risks to their operations, investors would be incentivized to 
come together to agree upon rules to mitigate debris.199 It has even been 
argued that private regulation of debris generation might be successful, and 
no international governance is required.200 Such proposals, however, assume 
that private activities are transparent, and thus an outlier may not free-ride 
 
195. See Hasin, supra note 5, Section IV(C). 
196. COMPETING IN SPACE, NASIC (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/ 
16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.pdf; John Polansky & Mengu Cho, Clas-
sification of Countries Worldwide According to Satellite Activity Level, 14 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
JAPAN SOCIETY FOR AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY 
JAPAN 7 (2016). 
197. See von der Dunk, Asteroid Mining, supra note 42, at 94. 
198. U.S. Space Policy Directive 2, supra note 181. 
199. Kurt, supra note 8, at 334; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1, at 508–
11. 













the system while maximizing short-term gains in wealth. In any event, inves-
tors will only endorse mitigation efforts up to a level that affects their prof-
itability. 
To a certain degree, public pressure affects the decision-making process 
of corporations. Therefore, investors may be motivated to sustain additional 
debris mitigation costs should the public express concern over debris prolif-
eration. This is evident from climate change efforts, where corporations take 
mitigation efforts, attributed, inter alia, to efforts at increasing profitability 
through public perception.201 It is reasonable to conclude that as space tour-
ism increases, two sets of incentives for mitigation may develop for inves-
tors: (1) collisions may become a business liability and (2) assuming public 
opinion favors debris mitigation, being a “green” or “nonpolluting” provider 
may become marketable to attract environmentally conscientious consum-
ers.  
Finally, claims by investors in respect of liability are affected by the fea-
sibility of insurance to properly compensate for losses. Specifically, if risk 
increases and insurance premiums rise so as to no longer provide sustainable 
protection,202 corporations may lobby States for increased mitigation rules, 
press for strict liability with caps to enable cost-effective insurance, and favor 
the installment of dispute settlement mechanisms to offset such costs.203 
Furthermore, investors will aspire to retain the protections found in invest-
ment treaties and extend their application to outer space activities. While 
some investors will promote debris mitigation rules that protect the health 
and safety of their crews and equipment, they will likely object to rules that 
undermine their gains in wealth and innovation. The equilibrium for their 
interests swings significantly towards wealth and innovation at the expense 
of other values but will likely be capped through public pressure. Any do-
mestic or international governance regimes should therefore put in place in-
centives to counterbalance such goals to optimize environmental protection, 
equity, health, and security. 
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4. International Organizations – Public and Private  
 
International organizations, public and private, form an integral part of 
global governance, affecting the development of any regime for space debris 
mitigation. These participants may be divided into three groups: (1) the 
United Nations system; (2) intergovernmental organizations, formal and in-
formal; and (3) non-governmental organizations.  
The United Nations system includes various participants with distinct 
interests and powers. On the one hand, the space-incapable States dominate 
the General Assembly, but its mandate is budgetary and declaratory. While 
General Assembly decisions may affect the development of opinio juris, they 
are not legally binding. In contrast, the Security Council, which can issue 
legally binding decisions, is dominated by space-capable States with veto 
power. The selection process for the Secretary-General also indicates that 
the Secretariat is likely to be more attuned to the interests of space-capable 
States.204  
An upsurge in space debris may adversely affect the security of space-
capable States.205 It is thus reasonable to conclude that at some point, unless 
mitigation efforts are successful, space debris may come to be characterized 
as a “threat to the peace.”206 The powers of the Security Council have been 
interpreted in the past to include indirect threats to peace under its man-
date.207 But in its belated response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Council 
only called for a universal cease-fire in countries where there was an ongoing 
armed conflict.208 This may signal a retreat to a restrictive interpretation of 
the Council’s constituent instrument.209 
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Nevertheless, facing clear security risks, space-capable States may be in-
clined to use their power through the Council to mandate mitigation rules, 
counterbalancing the risk of a regulatory race to the bottom. But as space-
capable States enjoy significant traffic management capabilities, the tipping 
point for such action may be higher than that which would impair the activ-
ities of States developing space capabilities. It is therefore important to con-
sider how the General Assembly and other organs may respond to an in-
crease in space debris. 
It is doubtful whether space-incapable States could successfully act 
through the General Assembly based on the Uniting for Peace precedent. 
Under this precedent, the General Assembly may act when the Security 
Council is deadlocked and failing to perform its function.210 This model’s 
pretension to demonstrate a superiority of the General Assembly over the 
Security Council is, as Reisman explained, an illusion: 
 
The effective powers in the Security Council, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, were joined in opposition to France and the United King-
dom and used the Assembly or, if one prefers, enabled it, by their support, 
to employ Uniting for Peace in ways that otherwise could not have been 
used.211 
 
The similarity of interests and incentives between the space-capable States 
indicates that a repeat occurrence is improbable, and the effectiveness of a 
General Assembly resolution based on this precedent would crumble absent 
similar support.  
Assuming that the Security Council mandates certain rules, it is interest-
ing to contemplate the possibility of an overwhelming majority of the Gen-
eral Assembly undermining the legally binding nature of such rules. The 
General Assembly may, arguendo, request a legal opinion from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. The Lockerbie case, although dismissed, introduced 
the proposition of an International Court of Justice judicial review of Chap-
ter VII resolutions.212 Whether the measures mandated by the Council could 
be considered ultra vires would depend more on the specific measure rather 
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than on the justification. Any overwhelming resolution of the General As-
sembly may tempt the court to address the question in an advisory opinion. 
But as such fictional rules would exhibit the consensus of the most powerful 
participants, they would significantly affect policy choices irrespective of the 
court’s opinion. 
Besides the Charter organs, other bodies, such as COPUOS, may pro-
vide a forum for discussions or decision-making. However, since any deci-
sion requires consensus, it would reflect the same balance of power. Never-
theless, given the ongoing discussions on debris in COPUOS, the transpar-
ency of the proceedings along with their publicity may affect public opinion 
and encourage compromises. Other international organizations may also 
participate in their specific fields of interest, such as health (the World Health 
Organization), labor (the International Labour Organization), or financing 
development (the World Bank Group). 
Formal and informal intergovernmental organizations could affect the 
regime’s evolution. The IADC influenced the voluntary guidelines for debris 
mitigation adopted by COPUOS and subsequently internalized by States. 
Other forums concluded between space-capable States, if such are estab-
lished through a development of the Artemis Accords, may further coordi-
nate their efforts and affect decisions. But other international organizations, 
such as those associated with climate change mitigation, may promote ge-
oengineering efforts through space activities, which could exacerbate the de-
bris problem. Since space capabilities augment efforts to confront climate 
change, an incentive exists for such organizations to discount the risks of 
debris generation.  
As with other aspects of human activity that exhibit either perceived or 
real environmental effects, efforts to mitigate space debris may be supported 
through non-governmental organizations.213 These may include public-pri-
vate partnerships whose objectives combine both those of investors and the 
specific State-parties. Although their effects on the formulation of any con-
stituent instruments may be limited and may depend on their composition, 
public-private partnerships may promote the manageability of the global 
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IV. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
 
International policymakers, lawyers, and scholars have proposed various av-
enues through which international law could affect the policy choices of par-
ticipants concerning the mitigation and removal of space debris. Proposals 
can be divided into two categories: (1) self-enforcing regulations by private 
and public entities and (2) international command and control regimes. This 
section will outline certain characteristics of the proposed structures and 
then evaluate their feasibility, effectiveness, and manageability.  
 
A. Self-enforcing Regulations 
 
Some scholars suggest that global governance for space debris mitigation 
could rely on independent decision-making by States or the private sector.215 
Such an approach follows two rationales: (1) the decline of multilateralism 
signals low prospects for negotiating another treaty216 and (2) because both 
space-capable States and private industry suffer adverse effects from space 
debris, they have an incentive to cooperate and adopt mitigation policies. 
Corporations, it is argued, could successfully reduce debris through coordi-
nation and best practices,217 and space-capable States could follow the IADC 
scheme to further coordinate their efforts on a semi-multilateral basis.218 
Such coordination, it is proposed, may even become legally binding and en-
courage others to join.219  
But non-legally binding regulation, although feasible, entails risks and 
limitations for its effectiveness and manageability. These proposals oversim-
plify the incentives of States and investors. As far as investors are concerned, 
as Paul B. Larsen explains, “Past experiences with the private sector regulat-
ing safety obstacles to their operation have proven problematic.”220 As he 
points out, their “motivation for competition and profit conflicts with and 
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is sometimes stronger than their motivation for safety,”221 but such motiva-
tion is counterbalanced by public opinion and economic considerations.222 
Furthermore, lack of universality and enforcement generates incentives for 
outlier behavior, prioritizing short-term gains in wealth over future risks to 
health and safety.223 
As an analogy, in confronting climate change, corporations have endeav-
ored to mitigate emissions in response to public pressure or gain a future 
advantage.224 Yet, such a process is less common where high polluters are 
concerned.225 For the latter, short-term profits are prioritized over potential 
long-term competitive advantages from developing emission-reducing tech-
nologies.226 Although debris increases costs for space investors, some may 
prefer guaranteed short-term gains in wealth, discounting both future risks 
to their business module and environmental concerns. It should further be 
noted that it took time until public pressure was successfully applied to con-
front the climate crisis, and it is far from certain when, or even if, such pres-
sure may be exhibited in relation to space debris.  
With respect to the capacity of the private sector to self-regulate an ex-
ternality, high seas fishing is a good example of a common resource and the 
effects on corporate decision-making.227 Absent a monopoly or strict regu-
lations,228 each participant is incentivized to grab more of the resource in 
question, thus depleting the resource and increasing the externality for all 
participants.229 While stark differences exist between the proliferation of 
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space debris and high seas fishing,230 such processes seem to be echoed in 
the decisions made by private entities engaging in space ventures. One ex-
ample is the launch of a Tesla into space;231 another is SpaceX’s “Starlink” 
project which generated concerns for space debris and led the European 
Space Agency to maneuver one of its satellites to avoid a collision.232 While 
these are only anecdotal examples, they illustrate that for a private partici-
pant, the potential benefit in wealth and innovation offsets any aggregated 
adverse effects from the externality shared by all stakeholders.  
The potential for States to counterbalance investors must not be overes-
timated and needs to account for each State’s specific interests, goals, and 
adaptation capabilities. For instance, for the United States, given its debris-
avoiding capabilities, a higher debris generation rate may be acceptable to 
promote its objective to develop private space capabilities. Although such an 
approach may not be shared by Russia and China, as long as their focus 
remains on public activities, these participants may continue to increase de-
bris through weapons testing.  
The incentives of individual space-capable States and private entities are 
complex and may not be geared towards effective mitigation of debris. The 
challenge is exacerbated by the realization that the incentives of space-capa-
ble States to rein-in investors provide space-incapable States with the oppor-
tunity to capitalize on the investors’ motivation to generate more wealth, 
which may lead to reduced efforts by all States in a regulatory race to the 
bottom. Thus, reliance upon private regulation or diffused regulation by 
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B. International Command and Control 
 
Some scholars and commentators propose to sway policy choices towards 
the mitigation of space debris through legally binding international regimes. 
The proposed regimes vary and include elements such as international or-
ganizations, binding standards, financial contributions, fees, verification 
methods, and dispute settlement.233 Although varying in form, proposals 
seek to affect policy choices through (1) uniform international standards for 
debris mitigation (preferably legally binding) while (2) incorporating certain 
financial instruments to encourage behavior or provide compensation. 
These two elements usually coexist with many proposals incorporating eco-
nomic and standardization elements. But a review of these proposals reveals 
an inherent flaw. 
Most scholarship on outer space regulation in general, and space debris 
in particular, fails to appreciate that instruments of global governance de-
velop through the international lawmaking process. The predominant ap-
proach can be labeled “regime transplantation,” predicated on the assump-
tion that if a certain international regime successfully confronted an exter-
nality, it could be adopted, mutatis mutandis, to confront another externality; 
in this case, space debris. This approach fails to consider the underlying pol-
icy-related attributes of the externality concerned. It overlooks the fact that 
an international regime reflects outcomes of certain interactions, between 
certain participants, with certain interests, capabilities, and leverages, ad-
dressing a certain externality, under certain circumstances, at a certain point 
in time. These attributes illustrate the case-specific, sui generis nature of each 
international regime and the arbitrariness of attempting to imprint an outcome 
on an entirely distinct set of interactions.  
Recognizing the sui generis character of international regimes does not 
exclude the benefits that a review of existing global governance could pro-
vide to regulatory proposals. Far from it. But it does indicate that an appro-
priate evaluation must consider the interactions which led to specific regimes 
and whether similar or different interactions are anticipated to occur with 
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respect to a given externality, rather than attempting to transplant the out-
comes of those interactions.  
 
1. Uniform International Standards 
 
Many authors lament the fact that the COPUOS guidelines are neither uni-
versal, specific, nor legally binding.234 The recommendatory and broad lan-
guage of the guidelines leads to each State setting its own rules or standards 
rather than to uniform international standards. This produces different de-
grees of compliance, and failure to implement does not constitute an inter-
nationally wrongful act. This propelled commentators to suggest that uni-
form international standards for debris mitigation must be accepted, prefer-
ably as legally binding rules.235 Such rules would ease verification of compli-
ance but entail the abrogation of sovereign discretion. As this section will 
explain, the different characteristics of space debris hardly justify the political 
costs and compromises associated with installing such standards through ne-
gotiations and their subsequent enforcement.  
Reviewing the situations in which the international community saw it 
necessary and appropriate to install uniform international standards reveals 
completely different settings. States have consented to uniform international 
standards to ameliorate and facilitate international externalities of activities 
that are inherently transboundary in nature and engage the jurisdiction of 
random participants. 
Participants installed uniform international standards and complied with 
them to alleviate conflicting sovereign jurisdictional interactions. Improving 
the mitigation of particular externalities was not a motivation. Activities gen-
erating space debris, however, remain subject only to the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of specific States. 
Universal standards for safety exist in various fields, such as for products 
through the International Organization for Standardization (non-legally 
binding but widely accepted),236 shipping under the International Maritime 
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Organization and its conventions,237 and commercial aviation through the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).238 This has encouraged 
scholars to propose different models for similar international standardization 
for mitigating space debris. Larsen, for instance, relied on the decision-mak-
ing process at the ICAO as a model for uniform and mandatory international 
standards and procedures for space debris.239 But the challenges arising from 
the interactions generated in these fields are not comparable to those stem-
ming from space activities, nor are the situations in which the interactions 
occur.  
Take the ICAO, for example. International commercial aviation, by def-
inition, crosses international boundaries into and over sovereign territories 
of various States, affecting not only the lives of passengers from multiple 
nationalities but also lives and property on the ground. Uniform interna-
tional safety standards for commercial aviation thus stem from conflicting 
sovereignties rather than the need to effectively mitigate the externality. Im-
agine a world in which each State sets its own safety standards for aircraft. 
Each aircraft manufacturer and operator would then be required to adjust 
their operations to the specific standards mandated by each State where the 
aircraft would land or even fly over, or otherwise be forced to avoid such 
States. The immense costs associated with such a situation render the possi-
bility of international commercial aviation dependent on international stand-
ardization. 
Michael Milde explained that “[c]ivil aviation could not have evolved 
without worldwide uniformity in regulations, standards and procedures.”240 
The Chicago Convention thus prescribes for the establishment of interna-
tional standards, justifying deviations solely when “impracticable” and man-
dating notification thereof.241 The rationale is that “in the absence of such 
notification the foreign aircraft operators would rely on the standardized 
procedures, facilities or services and the flight safety could be seriously jeop-
ardized.”242 As Paul Dempsey explained, “a State that fails to comply may 
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find its airman, aircraft air carrier, and/or airport certification and licenses 
not recognized as valid by a foreign government, thereby terminating their 
operations to, from, or through foreign territories, isolating it from the global 
economy.”243 
Uniform international aviation safety standards and their subjection to 
the decision-making process of the ICAO limit both the sovereign discretion 
of States and the decision-making of private participants. Participants were, 
and still are, ready to accept such international jurisdiction and mandates, 
confining, at least de jure, their discretion to an “impracticability” criterion, 
given the unique characteristics of international commercial aviation.  
Conflicting sovereignties underly other fields which commanded uni-
form international standards. Maritime shipping traverses the economic 
zones, territorial seas, and internal waters and enters ports of many different 
participants, with safety standards established under the International Mari-
time Organization conventions and enforced by port authorities.244 The 
globalization of markets also means that products produced in one jurisdic-
tion could be exported and used or sold inside the sovereign territory of 
other countries. Potential transboundary effects and the subjection of an ac-
tivity to multiple and changing jurisdictions justify the adoption of universal 
standards, even if not legally binding. The more severe the potential effects 
on health, safety, and the environment of each potentially affected sovereign, 
the more likely sovereigns are to subject their decision-making to uniform 
international standards and enforcement mechanisms. 
As alluded to above, the interactions and situations which led the inter-
national community to install uniform international standards in other con-
texts do not pertain to outer space. In contrast to commercial aviation, space 
activity can be conducted without ever engaging the jurisdiction of another 
sovereign or affecting the nationals of another State. While it is true that 
accidents may cause transboundary effects or the engagement of jurisdiction, 
it is not a prerequisite for successful space activities. Uniform standards 
would require States to relinquish part of their sovereign discretion without 
a correlating challenge from multiple sovereignties and to expend unneces-
sary political and economic resources to reach a consensus on substance and 
enforcement. Uniform international standards for debris mitigation consti-
tute a superfluous and thus improbable outcome of the lawmaking process. 
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Current global governance for space debris mitigation should focus on gen-
erating incentives for participants rather than dictating standards or proce-
dures.  
 
2. Economic Instruments to Affect Policy Choices 
 
Successful mitigation of space debris turns upon incentivizing participants 
to implement effective policies. To that effect, scholars have proposed a va-
riety of economic instruments, including increased liability,245 fees,246 
funds,247 Pigouvian taxes,248 cap and trade systems,249 trade mechanisms,250 
and more. The biggest drawback of such proposals, as some commentators 
recognize, lies in their infeasibility for adoption as international law.251 As 
this section will explain, such proposals are inconsistent with the interna-
tional lawmaking process through which international rules develop and ex-
hibit a limited potential enforcement capability vis-à-vis outliers. 
 
i. Monetary Obligations  
 
Domestic legal systems employ economic instruments, inter alia, to affect in-
dividual or corporate behavior.252 Direct carbon taxes, or indirect cap-and-
trade systems, were proposed and implemented domestically to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.253 Taxes on products such as gasoline or cigarettes 
discourage harmful activities that would otherwise impose additional costs 
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on society,254 while import taxes or tariffs can be used to protect certain do-
mestic industries.255 The rationale is that society not only imposes costs to 
force participants to minimize externalities but can use the resources col-
lected for other national interests.256 For example, one proposal is that car-
bon taxes could be collected and invested domestically to develop renewable 
energy.257 Although States may employ domestic taxes or fees to effectuate 
debris mitigation policies,258 proposals for imposing such measures interna-
tionally are misguided. 
For space debris, taxation or fees would apply only to developed space-
capable States that conduct space activities, forcing them to expend re-
sources to be distributed for the benefit of other States or to limit an exter-
nality with which these States have a greater ability to cope. While taxation 
can successfully promote change domestically,259 space-capable States are 
unlikely to impose international taxes upon themselves contrary to their own 
interests. For example, in the case of climate change efforts, although devel-
oped countries agreed to provide funding to developing counties for mitiga-
tion and adaptation efforts,260 doing so is a far cry from accepting a global 
tax on emissions. Similarly, the attempt to establish a cap-and-trade system 
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in the Kyoto Protocol261 failed to achieve broad compliance and the desired 
goals.262  
Fees have also been suggested by some as a method for affecting behav-
ior. For instance, some propose to distinguish between orbits and to impose 
fees on the most widely used.263 However, such proposals are unconvincing. 
Unlike taxes, fees have been implemented successfully under international 
law, but they were not intended to shape participants’ behavior. For example, 
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), fees 
are predicated upon the proposition that, except as provided for in the Con-
vention, the resources beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines of 
coastal States are the common heritage of mankind, and thus “owned” by 
the international community.264 The resources of the international Area were 
largely inaccessible when UNCLOS was signed.265 Also, most ocean re-
sources outside the Area were subject to exclusive State jurisdiction.266 The 
rationale of funding international organizations through fees may, in fact, 
extend to space, but such a proposition requires the existence of an interest 
for cooperative action through such institutions. More importantly, neither 
membership fees nor UNCLOS royalty payments were installed to affect 
policy choices.  
Similarly, because international law is founded on State consent, the 
proposition of using funds to compensate investors for damage from space 
debris when the liable party cannot be determined is also inappropriate for 
international law. National funds to compensate people involved in motor 
vehicle accidents are predicated on different incentives than those underlying 
space debris. Such funds are based on the proposition that almost all of so-
ciety engages in a dangerous activity that exposes it equally to its potential 
externality, and therefore the public should collectively pay for injured par-
ties when specific liability is unidentifiable. While a comparison in this case 
is appealing, one must not forget that space activity is far less prevalent than 
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the use of motor vehicles and, at least currently, the victims are not individ-
uals suffering bodily harm. Nor will accidents produce severe environmental 
harm or detrimental effects on human rights, which have previously justified 
attempts to establish international funds to compensate for damage caused 
by oil spills or nuclear activities (these funds also suffer from severe imple-
mentation problems).267  
Critically, because imposing duties on States under international law re-
quires their consent, financial instruments intended to affect policy choices 
become improbable. In principle, governments impose behavior-modifying 
taxes against the perceived self-interest of most, if not all, perpetrators of the 
activity. For such a purpose, domestic systems have a recognized legislator, 
either elected or imposed, that sets rules governing the actions of individuals 
and exercises a monopoly over domestic power. But international law lacks 
such a recognized authority, with only the Security Council possessing a sim-
ilar, but rather confined, power. Under international law, the participants 
whose actions constitute the target of any proposed behavior-modifying tax 
or fee must consent to imposing such an instrument upon themselves. Out-
liers would severely undermine the effectiveness and manageability of such 
rules—an investor could simply switch its operation to a non-member State 
to free-ride the system. Therefore, behavior modifying financial instruments 
must gain the consent of all potential participants, requiring them to impose, 
on themselves, behavior modifying financial instruments in contrast to their 
own perceived interest. That is as if smokers in the domestic system could 
exclude themselves from the cigarette tax. The absurdity of such a proposi-
tion illustrates why the international legal system, with its current structure, 
is unreceptive to behavior-modifying financial instruments.   
Monetary obligations are thus neither appropriate nor likely to be 
adopted on the international level. As any contributions would be predomi-
nantly laid on the developed space-capable States, which also possess the 
greatest ability to adapt, their benefit from such a system is reduced. Yet, a 
participant from a space-incapable State may be willing to increase debris 
generation and risk since its share of the compensation for the effects of the 
externality would be low. The international lawmaking process, based as it is 
upon State consent, is simply inappropriate for imposing such instruments 
to affect policy choices. 
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Several authors have proposed to increase State liability for accidents caused 
by debris in the hope that in doing so participants are deterred from gener-
ating debris and encouraged to remove it.268 The evolution of international 
investment law elucidates the limited effectiveness of liability without a dis-
pute settlement mechanism and the improbability of such an instrument be-
ing adopted for space debris given current interactions and situations.  
Before the establishment of the international investor-State dispute set-
tlement system, when the host-State injured a foreign investor, the investor’s 
home-State could have chosen to initiate a dispute with the host-State through 
diplomatic protection.269 Diplomatic protection, however, was subject to a 
political process, in which the investor’s claims and rights are subject to the 
discretion of the home-State.270 The next evolution of protection through 
access to domestic courts was also deemed insufficient given the perceived 
inherent bias of such institutions. The international investor-State dispute 
settlement system was established to promote international investments and 
overcome these challenges.271 The separation between an investment claim 
and the political process is essential for the effective protection of investors 
against damage from foreign States.272 Accordingly, many investment tribu-
nals have deemed procedural rights to be essential for protecting the sub-
stantive rights of investors.273  
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The evolution of international investment law indicates that liability for 
damage from space debris, without accompanying procedural rights, is in-
sufficient on its own to sway the policy choices of participants against caus-
ing damage to individuals. To claim damages against another State, an inves-
tor would be required to submit its claim in that State’s domestic courts274 or 
to convince its own State to initiate the claim, infusing inter-State consider-
ations into the equation.275 But even if the investor convinced the relevant 
State, or if the damage caused to a State justified an inter-State dispute, the 
claimant State would be required to establish jurisdiction for any legally bind-
ing award. For the substantive rule to effectively encourage debris mitigation, 
it must be accompanied by procedural rights. 
It is unlikely, however, that a system like the international investor-State 
dispute settlement system would be established for disputes between indi-
viduals and responsible States for damage from debris. The investment pro-
tection scheme strikes a balance between the participants: host-States benefit 
from foreign investments, but these investments also pose a risk to investors. 
The international investor-State dispute settlement system is intended to re-
duce such associated risks for investors by establishing a legally binding dis-
pute settlement mechanism. The States that agree to the mechanism (in an-
ticipation of hosting other State’s investors) assume the risk and gain the 
benefit. This simply does not, at this point in time, pertain to outer space.  
Consider the following example: State A and State B are both space-
capable States interested in promoting private space activities by their re-
spective entities—Entity A and Entity B. Each State benefits from the activ-
ity of its entity. State B has no incentive to reduce the costs of Entity A by 
providing it with a potential dispute settlement mechanism if it were to sus-
tain damage from the activities of Entity B. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
bilateral risk-benefit character of investment systems, space activities are vul-
nerable to adverse effects by the actions of third parties. So, a suggestion that 
States A and B may wish to provide a dispute settlement mechanism to re-
duce the costs of their respective entities disregards the fact that the potential 
risks and costs for Entity A and Entity B revert to their pre-dispute settle-
ment levels, with the introduction of the risks from activities by an outlier 
State C. 
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For such a mechanism to effectively sway policy choices, it must be uni-
versal or almost universal. As explained above, at this point, participants, 
especially emerging ones, may have contradictory incentives, prioritizing 
short-term gains in wealth and innovation. The international system is not 
structured to provide international legislative mandates but rather requires a 
careful balancing of conflicting interests and leverages. 
  
V. THE GLOBAL ORDER FOR SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION THROUGH 
THE REGIME EVOLUTION APPROACH 
 
The international regime governing space traffic management, including the 
mitigation of space debris, will develop through the international lawmaking 
process, in which the rules evolve pursuant to interactions between partici-
pants based on their goals, interests, and leverages. Although it is impossible 
to anticipate its precise development, this section will outline its anticipated 
evolution, proposing the adoption of a dynamic regime as its next stage.  
To recall, the international rules for space debris mitigation would de-
velop from “responses of key actors to . . . critical event[s],”276 to shape 
norms, practice, and law.277 But it is also important to emphasize that “[a] 
public order of human dignity is defined as one which approximates the op-
timum access by all human beings to all things they cherish.”278 Given that 
the proliferation of space debris risks upsetting society’s access to outer 
space and the benefits such access provides, the international community 
must aspire to install rules that would promote the highest aggregated gain 
in values for all participants. The high probability of outliers indicates that 
any instrument for space debris mitigation must command universality. As 
the prospects of assembling a parliamentary diplomatic arena to negotiate an 
authoritative instrument by majority vote279 are slim, such instrument must 
be adopted by consensus, thus balancing the conflicting or correlating inter-
ests of all relevant participants.  
Before turning to the stages of evolution, it is important to delineate the 
underlining characteristics of the externality in relation to the international 
lawmaking process. As the review above indicates, space debris mitigation is 
 
276. Reisman, Incidents, supra note 64, at 2. 
277. See generally id. 
278. Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 135, at 576. 
279. This requires the existence of many participants exerting different leverages. See 
generally 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMEN-












a problem of “cooperation” rather than “coordination.”280 Its resolution is 
in fact “mired by the fact that despite common goals, it is strategically ad-
vantageous for every actor to ‘cheat.’ ”281 As Professor Eyal Benvenisti ex-
plained, “The extant literature on global cooperation emphasizes the follow-
ing as being influential: the number of participants (whether a bilateral or 
multi-party game); their expectation that they will repeat their engagement 
indefinitely; and the quality of the information they have about the perfor-
mance of their partners.”282 He then emphasized that “additional antecedent 
factors that help predict successful cooperation [include]: (1) scope (whether 
single-issue or multiple issues); (2) frequency of iterations; and (3) relative 
vulnerability of the parties.”283  
From a policy perspective, mitigating the adverse effects of space debris 
constitutes a “super wicked” problem.284 Richard Lazarus explains that such 
problems defy “resolution because of enormous interdependencies, uncer-
tainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to 
develop a solution.”285 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber formulated the spe-
cial characteristics of “wicked” problems.286 These include, inter alia, the ab-
sence of a stopping rule to define an “end”; the existence of multiple possible 
solutions; lack of “true and false” solutions; no ability to determine whether 
a proposed solution is good; no opportunity for trial and error, with each 
action leaving “ ‘traces’ that cannot be undone”; and the underlying problem 
is a symptom of another problem.287 Building on their analysis, Kelly Levin 
and her co-authors added four unique features for what they define as “super 
wicked problems”: (1) the time for taking action is running out, “exacerbat-
ing the ‘one shot’ problem”; (2) the absence of a central authority under-
mines the prospect of cooperation; (3) “[t]hose seeking to end the problem 
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are also causing it”; and (4) “hyperbolic discounting,” in which decisionmak-
ers discount “evidence of significant impacts, [and] tend to make decisions 
that disregard this information and reflect, instead, very short time hori-
zons.”288 
Space debris exhibits similar challenges for the international lawmaking 
process. While scientific consensus may exist, the potentially catastrophic 
effects and timetables are unclear.289 Moreover, potential adaptation mecha-
nisms in combination with the natural atmospheric sink magnify the ambi-
guity of specific risks to participants, increasing the relative costs of any co-
operation. Any regime for the mitigation of space debris must be dynamic 
and of continuing duration because there is no defined “end” for mitigating 
an externality that increases with space activities. There are multiple possible 
avenues but no ability to determine, ex ante, the most successful path. Criti-
cally, given that success needs to be evaluated in the long term, any decision 
will leave significant factual and regulatory traces, and the possible adverse 
effects of failure could be catastrophic.  
Reducing space debris entails costs.290 A recent COPUOS report illus-
trates that for space-capable States, regulations must not hinder the devel-
opment of private industry, while for emerging participants, regulation must 
not hamper their ability to develop space capabilities or industry.291 The re-
port includes calls by States for equity, including the “view that there was a 
need for differentiated degrees of responsibility in the clearing of space debris, in 
line with the space activities of each Member State.”292  
Reviewing the evolution of the regime for the mitigation of greenhouse 
gas emissions reveals a stark similarity between the two externalities in rela-
tion to the international lawmaking process. The undisputed responsibility 
of space-capable States for existing debris underlies suggestions for imposing 
on them increased mitigation obligations and costs.293 In climate change ef-
forts, the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities similarly re-
sponds to the realization that, historically, most emissions were generated by 
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developed countries, while developing countries must generate such emis-
sions as a byproduct of industrialization critical for increasing their own qual-
ity of life.  
In addition, similarly to space debris, although some scientific consensus 
exists regarding greenhouse gas emissions, “there is a great deal of uncer-
tainty about the details,” including the severity of the result and ability to 
adapt.294 For some developing countries, urgent developmental concerns 
outweigh future risks from climate change.295 More importantly, climate 
change presents a greater danger to developing countries, primarily in the 
Southern Hemisphere and small island States, than it does to developed 
northern States, which may even benefit from change.296 Critically, devel-
oped countries possess greater capabilities to adapt to the adverse effects of 
climate change, arguably reducing their incentive to subject their decision-
making process to regulations that impose strict emission reductions.297  
With increased private and public space activities, the international com-
munity must confront yet another super wicked problem. The interactions 
that developed the regime governing climate change have much to teach 
scholars and policymakers about the feasibility of any regime to mitigate 
space debris. As analyzed below, this regime is anticipated to develop in three 
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A. Stage of Coordination 
 
In the initial stage of a regime’s evolution, the international community en-
gages in scientific discourse defining the problem, intergovernmental discus-
sions begin, and perhaps non-legally binding rules agreed upon. In the case 
of ocean resources, this was the age of mare liberum and its initial transfor-
mation during the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. For climate 
change, this was the stage before the adoption of the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani identified six stages of develop-
ment of the current international rules governing climate change efforts.298 
The first three of these stages, labeled “foundational phase,” “agenda-setting 
phase,” and “pre-negotiation phase,” constitute initial stages of discourse in 
which the problem is defined, publicized, and elevated to the intergovern-
mental realm for coordination between governments.299 Global governance 
for space debris mitigation is currently at this early stage of development.  
The problem was defined, publicized, and elevated to the intergovern-
mental level where the discourse of the problem has produced non-legally 
binding international guidelines by space-capable States and the United Na-
tions system, later internalized by States through domestic law. The inter-
governmental process continues but on a limited scale. The negotiations of 
the Artemis Accords, for instance, produced a political commitment rather 
than legally binding rules and are, in any event, concluded only on a multi-
lateral basis between certain space-capable States. This indicates that the 
United States and its allies do not currently consider a parliamentary diplo-
matic arena necessary or desirable. But the conclusion of the Accords indi-
cates that after internalization of the guidelines by States, they were again 
internationalized, continuing the international lawmaking process. 
The interactions observed in the preliminary stage promote awareness 
and produce “best practices,” in which States exchange knowledge and 
methods to reduce debris. During this stage, each State unilaterally deter-
mines the mitigation obligations it imposes on its activities or on those it 
authorizes. While susceptible to outliers, the limited number of active par-
ticipants and low risk allowed such rules to effectively sway policy choices 
while providing States with the flexibility to increase debris in furtherance of 
national interests (e.g., weapons testing or leeway for investors). This type of 
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governance allows the space-capable States to optimize their gain in wealth, 
innovation, and security while assuming limited safety risks in the short term. 
The currently limited ability of space-incapable States to lodge interfering 
claims reduces incentives for participants to establish a regime that promotes 
equity and addresses environmental concerns. As explained above, emerging 
participants, such as investors and space-incapable States, may prioritize 
short-term gains in wealth, but given that the activity generates a debilitating 
externality, others may exert pressure to reduce it. Public pressure may orig-
inate from accidents or simply through growing awareness,300 thus affecting 
the decisions of these participants. For space-incapable States, such govern-
ance facilitates the attraction of investors, but their reduced adaptation ca-
pabilities may generate an incentive to accept firmer rules, albeit with certain 
concessions to alleviate their equity claims.  
Thanks to the limited number of active participants, space-capable States 
have been able to balance their adaptation capabilities with acceptable debris 
levels. But greater participation of public and private entities diminishes the 
regime’s effectiveness. Despite the augmented adaptation abilities of space-
capable States, the increased possibility for outlier behavior, which could 
threaten gains in wealth, safety, health, and security for these States, propels 
the need to strengthen manageability. This process will inevitably lead to the 
regime’s evolution from coordination and national regulation to interna-
tional cooperation. The following section will therefore propose a coopera-
tion regime for space debris mitigation. 
  
B. Stage of Cooperation  
 
Greater participation generates greater incentives for cooperation to alleviate 
the externality caused by the proliferation of space debris. As Eric Posner 
and Alan Sykes explained, “[w]hen the behavior of governments deviates 
from global cost-effectiveness, an opportunity for beneficial cooperation 
arises that can improve the welfare of all nations as long as cooperation is not too 
costly.”301 Significant policy costs affect the regime’s evolution: space debris 
results from essential activities that have various effects on multiple values 
for participants and is produced through increasingly frequent interactions 
between participants with varying levels of vulnerability. Because even minor 
and random participation could generate debris, successful mitigation must 
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be inclusive and designed to incorporate the most participants possible, 
whether active or potential. Inclusivity requires compromises between the 
interests and goals of varied participants, sounding in levels of discretion, 
jurisdiction, and compliance mechanisms.  
As discussed above, a rigid and static regime would be inappropriate 
given the dynamic, developing, and inconsistent nature of space activities. A 
regime must include dynamic elements in its governance structure to opti-
mize values and allow decision-makers to quickly adapt their mitigation and 
compliance strategies. Because of the participants’ varying stages of devel-
opment and different economic interests, broad consensus requires that any 
obligations be discretionary and include a bottom-up engagement of the pri-
vate sector. Although the exact content of the rules will develop through the 
lawmaking process, to optimize the aggregated gain in values, a feasible re-
gime must include the following elements: (1) principles; (2) dynamic target 
setting; (3) verification through transparency; (4) bottom-up engagement; (5) 
dispute settlement; (6) assistance in space traffic management; (7) technolog-
ical and financial assistance; and (8) preventing the regulatory race to the 
bottom. Claims relating to these elements will be discussed below. 
 
1. Principles  
 
As explained above, successful global governance for space debris mitigation 
must be dynamic and of continuing duration in order to accommodate 
changing technological capabilities and factual circumstances. It must stipu-
late a set of principles, using generic terms, that would govern the relations 
between the parties in the long term while allowing for their evolutionary 
interpretation. Such principles may be articulated in a framework convention 
(similar to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) or a constit-
uent instrument of an organization. The following discussion will outline the 
most important principles that will guide the other elements of the regime. 
Participants must agree upon a definition of what constitutes space de-
bris and the nature of the relationship between this definition and the con-
cept of a “space object” for purposes of liability, responsibility, and jurisdic-
tion. As explained above, the definition must exclude unidentifiable debris, 
certain dispensable component parts, and perhaps even inoperable equip-
ment from the definition of space objects.302 Although the reduced respon-
sibility entailed in such a proposition could, arguendo, undermine the prospect 
 












of affecting policy choices through liability,303 as explained above, liability 
produces limited, even illusionary, effects on policy choices, especially with 
respect to small and unidentifiable debris. 
Besides clarifying definitions, principles must include a general commit-
ment to undertake best efforts to reduce debris. The obligation may be in-
ferred from the treaties and is incorporated in the Artemis Accords. It also 
stems from the concept of sovereignty as responsibility304 and the legal 
maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.305 As Benvenisti explained, as trustees 
of humanity, sovereign States must take into account the interests of all af-
fected stakeholders in their decision-making process when producing inter-
national effects on their interests.306 Taking into account does not mean af-
fording primacy, but consideration. If all participants remain guided by such 
a conviction while retaining a certain degree of discretion, the values of eq-
uity, environmental protection, and safety could be balanced with wealth, 
innovation, and security, on a broader scale. 
Any inclusive regime must be based, even if only partially, on the princi-
ple of common but differentiated responsibilities. But it should avoid pre-
scribing a differentiation in strict mitigation obligations between States, e.g., 
space-capable and -incapable States, differentiated as Annex I and Annex II 
parties in a potential treaty. Such differentiation failed to gain traction in cli-
mate change efforts. Since the space-incapable States’ ability to contribute to 
the externality in space is significantly lesser than with greenhouse gas emis-
sions, it is doubtful that space debris negotiations will produce such rules. 
Rather, claims expected to gain broad support include differentiation in lim-
ited financial or technological contributions, assistance in adaptation through 
traffic management, and national differentiation based on State discretion.  
To achieve the universality essential for the regime’s success, the gov-
ernance structure should impose obligations of conduct rather than of result, 
be contingent on national discretion, and encourage participation and com-
pliance.307 At the same time, obligations must be predicated on principles of 
scientific accuracy and efficiency. Scholars and policymakers must remember 
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that promoting outer space activities and the benefits these provide consti-
tutes the objective of any international regulation. The mitigation of debris 
serves only as the instrument to achieving this objective. Any international 
governance structure must ensure debris reduction to the point where any 
additional resources spent for prevention or removal would exceed the costs 
produced by the externality itself. While any mitigation targets must neces-
sarily prevent the potential of a Kessler Syndrome materializing, the interna-
tional community would be required to conduct reasonable risk assessments 
and set appropriate targets for debris mitigation, subject to subsequent sci-
entific reevaluation. Such targets could vary based on orbit, fragment size, or 
type of debris but would need to be measurable to avoid incurring costs to 
reduce debris beyond the point of economic efficiency. 
The increase in private activities may diminish the effectiveness of gov-
ernmental control over activities States have authorized and supervise. Spe-
cifically, increased private ventures reduce the effectiveness of the broad re-
sponsibility under Outer Space Treaty Article VI as international law. The 
more private ventures become independent from State activities, the less 
these ventures should be considered “national activities.” Globalization and 
the possibility of launches without authorization308 further undermine the 
effectiveness of Article VI in extending State responsibility for national ac-
tivities, comprised of all activities by its nationals. Therefore, the interna-
tional community should consider conforming responsibility and liability is-
sues regarding outer space activities to principles of due diligence and attrib-
ution under international law.309 
Responsibility for private activities in space should align with general at-
tribution under international law. Negotiating an instrument for space debris 
mitigation provides an opportunity for the international community, espe-
cially the space-capable States, to adopt an interpretation distinguishing re-
sponsibility based on jurisdiction and presumed degrees of control exercised 
over relevant entities:310 (1) jurisdiction over sovereign activities, which trans-
lates into overall international responsibility given the assumed high degree 
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of control; (2) supervisory jurisdiction over non-sovereign activities by the 
relevant non-governmental organizations, resulting in a due-diligence type 
of responsibility consistent with an assumed lower and fluctuating degree of 
control; and (3) jurisdiction of member States over activities conducted by 
international organizations, resulting in a shared overall responsibility with 
the international organization, again assuming a high degree of State control. 
The final, critical principle constitutes the bottom-up engagement of the 
private sector as part of the international lawmaking process. As Professor 
Daniel Esty and Dena Adler explained, in the twenty-first century, an inter-
national regime architecture based solely on the Westphalian State system is 
“ill-equipped to deal with many of today’s global challenges.”311 Such con-
cerns apply neatly to space debris, not only due to the sheer distance from 
any effective control by a terrestrial government but also because corpora-
tions may exacerbate the externality by employing “flags of convenience,” 
operating from the high seas, and launching independently of any govern-
mental oversight.312 The development of private capabilities indicates that 
corporations may become outliers on their own accord,313 making the effec-
tiveness of any mitigation efforts contingent upon cooperation with the pri-
vate sector.314 Private entities should therefore be integrated into the inter-
national regime.  
 
2. Dynamic Target Setting 
 
Broadly speaking, three methods exist for swaying policy choices towards 
mitigating space debris: (1) reliance upon self-enforcement of non-legally 
binding guidelines, (2) legally binding negotiated commitments for targeted 
mitigation quantification, and (3) dynamic target setting based on national 
discretion. As this section will explain, the third option is the most appropri-
ate for achieving this public policy goal. 
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The current international governance regime follows the first approach, 
but its effectiveness diminishes with increased participants and potential out-
liers.315 The second approach includes installing mandatory mitigation stand-
ards, financial instruments such as taxes and fees, and specific debris mitiga-
tion targets for participants. Although the analogy is imprecise, the Kyoto 
Protocol attempted a similar regulatory approach for the mitigation of green-
house gas emissions, failing precisely because of the same policy character-
istics exhibited by space debris. The lessons learned from Kyoto indicate that 
as long as such characteristics persist, the feasibility of participants adopting 
the second approach is doubtful, as is its potential to effectively sway policy 
choices towards increased mitigation. The interactions observed so far indi-
cate that the implementation of dynamic nationally based targets, similar to 
the method chosen in the Paris Agreement, will generate the broad partici-
pation essential for successful debris mitigation. 
Targets for debris mitigation may be composed of caps on debris gener-
ation based on the tonnage of space activities, the number of launches, or 
the rate of growth.316 Regardless of the specific metric chosen, it must be 
relative and measurable progressively. States must be able to demonstrate 
that through mitigation efforts the relative debris they generate, both short 
term from launches and long term from deorbiting debris, improves over 
time. “Improvement” in this sense may be curve-shaped for States develop-
ing space capabilities. In the initial stages of capabilities development, a 
State’s debris generation will necessarily increase, but parties would commit 
to a dynamic reduction process rather than to strict obligations. Such a dy-
namic process protects the interests of space-incapable States to increase 
their gain in values through space activities. It does not hamper their ability 
to develop capabilities, as some claimed in COPUOS.317 Differentiation 
based on national interests, while committing to the progressive realization 
of mitigation objectives, may be acceptable to most, or even all, members of 
the international community.   
In the same sense that the Paris Agreement expects States to increase 
their ambition for mitigation in every successive nationally determined con-
tribution, any instrument to mitigate debris must also encourage every State 
conducting or authorizing space activities to progressively reduce the levels 
of debris it generates. Assume, for instance, that State A is developing space 
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capabilities. Given the need to develop technology and capabilities, the de-
bris generation may be a high level of X at the beginning. In the first com-
mitment, it may thus commit to X+5. In its following commitment, it should 
aspire to X+2, then X-1, X-5, and so forth. For State B, an established space-
capable State, with an existing relative debris generation of Y, it may commit 
to Y-1, Y-2, and so on.  
Dynamic targets promote universality and cost-effectiveness because 
they reduce the probability that a participant will conclude that the benefits 
of withdrawal exceed those of compliance. While shaming could marginally 
affect States’ choices, the ability to adjust commitments according to specific 
security or wealth considerations could promote cooperation even under 
more modest mitigation targets. As will be explained below, to encourage 
emerging participants to reduce their relative debris generation, space-capa-
ble States should execute agreements to implement limited technology shar-
ing and financial contributions to assist developing participants. 
 
3. Verification Through Transparency  
  
To be meaningful, dynamic targets must be accompanied by transparent 
tools for the verification of progress. Dynamic targets, by nature, do not 
command strict verification and compliance mechanisms. But a transparent 
procedure for evaluating progress could allow administrative bodies to signal 
the need to increase commitments or shame outliers and motivate action.318  
Any verification process must not compromise the significant security 
interests associated with space activities. Therefore, it is reasonable to con-
clude that military activities and their resulting debris should be exempt from 
scrutiny as an initial step. As discussed above, although significant debris 
originated from weapons testing, participants are unlikely to self-impose lim-
itations to testing until they have developed the desired capabilities and fur-
ther testing becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, given the inherent secrecy 
involved, States are unlikely to consent to full transparency regarding their 
military space activities, even if limited to debris generation. As an indication 
of this, the Artemis Accords limit transparency between space-capable allies 
to “policies,” “plans,” and “scientific information.”319 It would therefore be 
easier to achieve consensus for debris mitigation by excluding purely military 
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activities from either target setting or verification—or both. Admittedly, par-
ticipants could abuse this limitation, defining civilian activities as “military-
related,” but the dynamic nature of the targets themselves indicates a mini-
mal adverse effect. 
To properly evaluate progress, the verification mechanism must include 
transparent periodical reporting. The purpose would be “to ensure clarity 
and tracking of progress towards achieving the parties’ NDCs [nationally de-
termined contributions] and adaptation actions, as well as to provide clarity 
on support provided and received by parties.”320 Space debris originates 
from activities by some participants while potentially affecting all partici-
pants relative to their stage of national development and adaptation capabil-
ities. A reporting mechanism for space debris mitigation should thus extend 
only to States that launch, procure, or otherwise authorize space activities.321 
It would be counterproductive to extend the reporting responsibility to all 
activities by nationals; reporting must follow the ability to regulate and exer-
cise some control. As will be further elaborated below, issue linkage between 
technological and financial assistance and reporting is necessary to ensure 
proper incentivization of compliance. 
Reporting on adaptation capabilities should be performed by all States 
that may potentially authorize or launch space activities. Such reporting en-
sures that when launches occur, States avoid creating unnecessary risks to 
others. Ensuring that all States develop minimal capabilities to avoid debris 
through information sharing is essential and may require limited concessions 
from space-capable States. The United States, for instance, already shares its 
traffic management capabilities with some partners.322 Assisting others to 
avoid collisions would benefit the more substantial participants. 
Verification must not only rely on data collection but incorporate an in-
dependent scientific assessment. The mandate of an independent review 
must include identifying failures, employing shaming tools, and suggesting 
improvements when appropriate. Confining the decision-making process of 
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a regulatory international organization risks undermining its ability to re-
spond to evolving risks and to propose necessary measures.323 It is therefore 
important that verification institutions can make dynamic interpretations of 
their constituent instrument and have the power to expose non-compli-
ance.324 Although shaming seems a poor substitute for enforcement, it has 
consequences, as complying participants may implement political or eco-
nomic tools to express their disapproval of non-compliance. 
Note that verification of progress is unlikely to be accompanied by trade 
mechanisms to enforce the obligation to mitigate debris. The Montreal Pro-
tocol325 and the prospect of trade sanctions have been proposed as a model 
for a space debris instrument.326 But the circumstances that commanded 
such measures for the mitigation of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) are 
distinct from those concerning the mitigation of space debris. This proposi-
tion thus disregards the distinct characteristics of the externality in relation 
to the lawmaking process. The Montreal Protocol327 imposes obligations on 
all members to phase out ODSs, even if under differentiated responsibilities, 
in accordance with fixed timetables. It is enforced through trade sanctions 
on non-members and non-compliant members.328 The Protocol successively 
reduces ODSs and advances the world towards restoring the ozone layer by 
the mid-twenty-first century. But it was directed at a rather simple problem 
with specific characteristics. ODSs are specific aerosols used in certain prod-
ucts, produced by limited companies with available alternatives.329 Replace-
ment of ODSs had limited economic implications and did not require sig-
nificant investment, while the health risks were certain and extremely high.330 
Critically, production of ODSs was not a necessary byproduct of developing 
an essential industry to promote other values. Therefore, replacing their use 
had a limited scope of effect. It is also important to remember that it would 
have been increasingly costly in both wealth, health, and innovation to try 
 
323. See, e.g., Benvenisti, WHO, supra note 280, at 595. 
324. On dynamic interpretation, see ARSANJANI, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 209. 
325. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 
1522 U.N.T.S. 3.  
326. Vishakha Gupta, supra note 3, at 36; Weinzierl, supra note 79, at 187. 
327. The treaty has since been amended to include additional ODSs. On the negotiating 
history and success of the Montreal Protocol, see generally BENEDICK, supra note 259. 
328. See Scott Barrett, The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agree-
ments, 19 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMICS 345, 346 (1997). 
329. POSNER & SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION, supra note 294, at 229–30. 












and adapt to the destruction of the ozone layer, to which all participants 
would be exposed unless it was arrested. It is clear that such characteristics 
do not apply to space debris, and it is unlikely that State interactions would 
produce a similar solution. 
Trade mechanisms, however, may be employed by interested parties. As 
was suggested in respect of greenhouse gas emissions, “climate clubs,”331 or 
in this case “debris clubs,” may be formed as consortiums of interested 
States to employ trade mechanisms between themselves to encourage further 
mitigation by parties and non-parties. The IADC and the Artemis Accords 
serve as examples for coordination and cooperation between major space-
capable States concerning space activities in general and debris specifically. 
Currently, however, given the strained relationship between Russia, China, 
and the United States, clubs may have little overall effect without the joint 
participation of these States. 
 
4. Bottom-Up Engagement 
 
As explained above, given the nature of space activities, private participants 
may become outliers on their own accord or encourage developing partici-
pants to lower debris mitigation standards. To ensure the commitment of 
private entities to the mitigation of space debris, space investors should be 
allowed to assume international commitments for debris mitigation. In re-
cent years, global governance has shifted from intergovernmental organiza-
tions to include many private entities exercising semi-regulatory roles in in-
ternational law, such as standard setting and verification of compliance.332 
As Esty and Adler noted, the Paris Agreement failed to implement the nec-
essary step of incorporating private entities and subnational units in favor of 
a strict Westphalian architecture.333 They explained that “global issues occur 
along a structural spectrum, with some needing multi-tiered solutions and 
some being amenable to more traditional top-down solutions. Where on this 
spectrum a particular issue falls depends on the specific nature of the con-
cern and the distribution of authority and capacity to respond.”334 In the 
context of space debris, federal units, cities, and municipalities may not be 
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as relevant as they are to greenhouse gas emissions, but the cooperation of 
space investors is essential for success.  
As explained above, corporations will aspire to increase their gains in 
wealth and innovation, while States should establish rules to promote health, 
safety, security, equity, human dignity, and environmental protection. But 
States have conflicting incentives, and space-incapable States may attract in-
vestors through lenient regulations, thus sacrificing such values for the ben-
efit of their wealth and innovation. The fact that space activities may largely 
be removed from terrestrial jurisdiction and control indicates that the coop-
eration of private entities is essential for mitigating both the regulatory race 
to the bottom and the debris problem.  
In producing debris, space corporations generate an externality that af-
fects their field of operations.335 Therefore some incentives to cooperate 
with mitigation efforts exist. This contrasts with the climate crisis, where the 
businesses generating the externality, such as fossil fuel companies, electricity 
producers, and auto manufacturers, do not directly suffer the adverse effects. 
Space debris provides the opportunity to engage the private “polluters” in 
achieving international public policy objectives.  
An international instrument for space debris mitigation should incorpo-
rate non-governmental organizations as observers336 and allow private space 
investors to assume international commitments for progressive debris miti-
gation. Investors could benefit from the publicity and respect involved, as 
well as reduced debris, and space-capable States would offset the leverage 
space-incapable States may exert in attracting investors with weaker commit-
ments. Space debris mitigation thus provides the opportunity to introduce a 
new international treaty architecture, modeled on Esty and Adler’s proposal. 
 
5. Dispute Settlement  
 
Dispute settlement constitutes an important part of any effective interna-
tional regulation. In contrast to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, 
where violations are necessarily non-adversarial,337 in the case of space de-
bris, certain failures may exhibit adversarial qualities. As explained above, 
however, as an instrument to affect space debris policy choices, liability is 
relatively weak, given both lack of jurisdiction and evidentiary problems, and 
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investor-State dispute resolution mechanisms stem from characteristics lack-
ing in space activities. But for cooperation purposes, dispute settlement may 
be weaker and voluntary, with enforcement between States contingent more 
on verification than arbitration.  
International law usually provides for rather weak enforcement mecha-
nisms relying mostly on reciprocity, power, and outcasting.338 Many treaties 
prescribe for dispute settlement through negotiations, non-legally binding 
commissions, and, on rare occasions, international arbitration. But even 
when States consent to extensive inter-State arbitration, such as under UN-
CLOS, exclusions apply, demonstrating that international dispute settlement 
rarely includes issues at the core of national interests.339 The prominent ex-
ception is found in international investment protection treaties,340 but even 
this regime is under stress.341  
States would probably reject a mandatory third-party decision-making 
instrument for space debris that would affect their ability to protect their 
national security and optimize domestic gain in values such as health, wealth, 
and innovation. Rather, any dispute settlement will likely require negotiations 
in good faith or prescribe an additional optional consent, as was the case of 
the optional protocol to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone.342 But, were the verification mechanism to allow an ex-
tended ability to shame a participant that may reduce the need for any dispute 
resolution. It should also be noted that private participants may be exposed 
to compulsory domestic litigation and may be susceptible to enforcement by 
domestic courts. 
 
6. Assistance in Space Traffic Management  
 
International space traffic management must develop to avoid collisions be-
tween active spacecraft and space debris or immovable active objects during 
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launch, orbit, or reentry.343 Adaptation to the space debris problem means 
developing and deploying monitoring and maneuvering capabilities to avoid 
space debris and increasing protection capabilities for new satellites and 
craft, especially from small and unidentifiable fragments. As alluded to 
above, for an international regime for debris mitigation to be efficient, it 
must balance mitigation and adaptation. Increasing adaptation may require 
less investment in mitigation and vice-versa. 
Excluding the dreaded, though uncertain, materialization of a Kessler 
Syndrome, the space debris problem provides for much greater capacity for 
adaptation than greenhouse gas emissions, thus mandating a different ap-
proach. In the case of greenhouse gas emissions, adaptation is analogous to 
using a band-aid to cover a gunshot wound. Many participants can do little 
to adapt to rising sea levels that threaten to sink cities and nations, destroy 
coral reefs and biodiversity, and diminish primary food supplies. But for 
space debris, participants may avoid a specific activity altogether or success-
fully adapt through technological innovation by increasing tracking, maneu-
verability, or protection.  
Establishing international data sharing for identification and location of 
debris344 not only promotes mitigation but may be acceptable to space-capa-
ble States possessing such means. By increasing the ability of States and pri-
vate entities to avoid debris, space-capable States will achieve gains in safety 
and security while avoiding injury to other values.  
 
7. Technological and Financial Assistance  
  
Participants wishing to mitigate space debris must incur costs to develop and 
implement relevant technological innovations. Thus, space-incapable States 
will likely demand financial assistance and technology sharing from devel-
oped space-capable States as a precondition for accession to any interna-
tional regime for space debris mitigation. The space-capable States will have 
an incentive for some concession on this point, as increased debris adversely 
affects their wealth, safety, and security. To prevent a regulatory race to the 
bottom, emerging participants must be incentivized to implement stricter 
debris mitigation schemes by, inter alia, providing them with the means and 
technology to do so. To gain broad consensus, however, any such element 
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must be subject to compliance verification and be more voluntary than man-
datory. 
In the past, claims for equity of developing participants were accompa-
nied by requests for technology sharing or financial assistance. When raised 
as preconditions for accessing resources, such claims have had limited suc-
cess.345 As long as a level playing field has been preserved, technological edge 
has not been a source of public outcry.346 On the other hand, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agree-
ment provide for technology sharing and financial contributions for devel-
oping countries for mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
However, while certain elements, such as traffic management and infor-
mation about the location of debris, may be shared internationally, other el-
ements, such as maneuverability technology and protective equipment are 
unlikely to be shared. As explained above, space debris mitigation depends 
on technology, yet the more space-capable States invest in developing a pri-
vate industry, the more the technology will be proprietary private technol-
ogy. Adaptation technology, such as maneuvering systems, protective equip-
ment, and guidance systems, may provide a competitive edge for corpora-
tions, thus making them extremely valuable. In addition, space technology 
could be dual-use, meaning that it may have both military and civilian appli-
cations.347 For some participants, providing others with space technology 
may be akin to promulgating nuclear power as a replacement for fossil 
fuels.348 Nuclear weapon programs have been developed under the cover of 
civilian nuclear power generation, and space programs may be used to de-
velop ballistic missiles.349  
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In conclusion, some technology sharing will become necessary as debris 
proliferation increases the costs of space operations for States and investors. 
The more mitigation technology each participant employs, the less additional 
investment in both mitigation and adaptation technology would be required 
for others. At the same time, the significant security implications require 
finetuning technology sharing to avoid the sharing of dual-use technology. 
Thus, technology sharing will likely be limited to that which reduces debris 
during launch or in orbit, rather than to deorbiting technology, which may 
include propulsion and other capabilities. Investors will, however, be reluc-
tant to share technology, and it is unclear whether overall reduced costs will 
provide sufficient incentives. 
 
8. Preventing the Regulatory Race to the Bottom  
 
The effectiveness of any instrument adopted for space debris mitigation de-
pends, inter alia, on reducing the potential of a regulatory race to the bottom 
that weakens mitigation controls. To that end, any governance structure 
must incorporate rules that: (1) reduce incentives for space-incapable States 
to relax mitigation regulations, (2) facilitate all States in increasing their com-
mitments for debris mitigation, and (3) discourage investors from shifting 
their operations to a State with lenient mitigation regulations. This section 
outlines a proposal to utilize the interrelation between international invest-
ment law and space debris mitigation to promote such public policy goals. 
Esty explains that with respect to terrestrial investments, “there is little 
empirical evidence of companies moving to ‘pollution havens.’ ”350 He sug-
gests that differences in environmental commitments may even be beneficial 
from a trade perspective.351 While many factors may affect a company’s 
choice to move terrestrial operations, certain counter considerations exist. 
First, such operations will necessarily be subject to some level of control and 
risk of a political decision by the host-State, which may or may not be subject 
to investment protection. Second, certain ventures require natural resources 
and employees with expertise that may not exist in such “havens.” Finally, 
infrastructure may be difficult to move, jeopardizing long-term reliance upon 
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currently lenient regulations, while challenging amendments through invest-
ment protection is costly and far from certain to succeed. Space investments 
are somewhat different in this regard. 
Launch facilities will exhibit similar characteristics, but post-launch ac-
tivities are only theoretically subject to the jurisdiction of the launching or 
authorizing State. These States, especially if they are space-incapable, may 
have only a limited ability to exercise control or pose any risk to investments. 
Operators could register in one State while conducting their operations en-
tirely in another State and threaten to amend such de jure jurisdiction if reg-
ulations change. With expropriation and domestic litigation proceedings 
against investors in host-States becoming less likely, the potential for a race 
to the bottom increases. To borrow from environmental rules, in certain cir-
cumstances, 
 
competition across jurisdictions may precipitate a welfare-reducing cycle of 
weakening environmental commitments as political leaders seek to relax 
their environmental standards to attract investment and jobs. In practice, 
governments rarely lower their legal standards to improve their competitive 
position. They may, however, relax the enforcement of these standards or 
fail to raise environmental requirements to optimal levels for fear of expos-
ing their industries to higher costs than foreign competitors face.352 
   
Furthermore, pursuant to what has been called the “governance gap,” 
space investors, like other foreign investors in the past, “may have sufficient 
economic power to dissuade a state from regulating them, so their duties 
under local law may be in name only.”353 To encourage emerging participants 
to impose increased standards on mitigation and progress towards more am-
bitious targets, any incentive to reduce regulatory enforcement must be 
counteracted.  
Allowing an externality to adversely affect a common area, as Esty in-
sightfully commented, is an “unfair (and economically inefficient) basis on 
which to establish a competitive advantage.”354 Esty explained how trade 
agreements might present opportunities to confront such challenges: 
 
[The North American Free Trade Agreement’s] investment chapter also 
broke new ground in addressing environmental issues. . . . The treaty also 
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contains a “pollution haven” proviso that declares that parties will not seek 
to attract investments by relaxing environmental standards or cutting back 
on enforcement—language recently replicated by the EU and Canada in 
their 2017 trade agreement [the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement].355  
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement provision, however, pro-
vided only for consultation in case of the commitment’s violation,356 and the 
recent United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement removed even this 
symbolic normative statement.357 Crucially, neither the North American Free 
Trade Agreement nor the similar Article 24.5 of the EU-Canada Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement358 provides for enforcement of a 
normative obligation or even excludes projects attracted through relaxed en-
vironmental standards from investment protection. An instrument adopted 
for space debris mitigation must, however, exclude certain investments in 
space from investment protection. Doing so would discourage corporations 
from shifting operations to potential “debris havens.”  
This section proposes two interrelated modifications for the investment 
protection system: (1) the exclusion of investments located in outer space 
from investment protection, and (2) the exclusion of foreign investments 
attracted through lenient debris mitigation standards from the definition of 
a qualifying investment. These modifications will incrementally affect deci-
sions through their application by investment tribunals, which will be re-
quired to take them into account for treaty application and interpretation 
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i. Exclusion of Investments Located in Outer Space 
  
Investments located entirely or primarily in outer space should be excluded 
from investment protection. This proposal stems from two interrelated char-
acteristics of such investments: (1) the control exercised by the host-State is 
limited, and (2) extending such protections is detrimental to the home-State.  
In a 2018 issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade, several authors 
considered the application of the investment law regime to outer space ac-
tivities.360 The authors assumed that the extension of investment protection 
to space activities was warranted or constituted a beneficial international pol-
icy. As the international investor-State dispute settlement system is already 
under serious stress, considering whether such coverage was plausible under 
definitions found in investment treaties, as the authors had,361 is insufficient. 
Scholarship must consider whether the international community would gain 
from the extension of investment protection to space activities, that is, 
whether it is good policy and whether expansion could result in another 
backlash from private capital and technology exporting States as an indicator 
of whether it would be a good systemic policy. Careful consideration leads 
to the conclusion that it would not. 
Some suggest that providing investors the necessary assurances by ex-
tending investment protection would promote the development of space ca-
pabilities and would thus be beneficial.362 This is based on two interrelated 
misconceptions: (1) the triangular relationship between the home-State, 
host-State, and investor extends equally into outer space; and thus (2) space 
investments are identical to terrestrial investments in the sense that protec-
tion offsets political risk for investors from the host-State.363 When space 
investments are located solely—or primarily—in outer space, the rationale 
of investment protection under this triangular relationship ceases to exist. 
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Operating in outer space under a flag of convenience State would only 
subject the investor to risks arising from the State’s modifications to the au-
thorization and its supervision,364 rather than subjecting its tangible property 
to potential expropriation. To be sure, licenses and permits issued by host-
States would be considered eligible assets under most, if not all, asset-based 
definitions of investment. Many early definitions of investment were ex-
tremely broad, extending to “every kind of asset” and “designed to protect 
as wide a range of investment forms as possible,”365 with some specifically 
referring to “licenses” as examples for such assets.366 But even the recent 
United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement, which prescribes a much 
narrower definition of an eligible investment, would extend coverage to li-
censes to conduct space activity as these will likely confer rights protected 
under domestic law.367 Scholars might quibble over whether it truly includes 
risk, but risk as an element of the Salini test only applies to disputes under 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States368 and treaties that include such conditions 
under the definition of investment.369  
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Under normal circumstances, an authorization or license for a foreign 
investor to conduct space activities would be covered under many definitions 
of “investment.” Although some treaties may include an “in the territory” 
requirement either for a qualified investment, or the dispute settlement 
mechanism,370 tribunals have varied on how strictly such a “condition” was 
interpreted or applied to limit the international investor-State dispute settle-
ment system.371 But while the property itself may be in space, and thus strictly 
speaking, outside the “territory” of the State, a license to operate is not.  
A tribunal faced with a claim by an investor concerning a license is there-
fore likely, in many instances, to conclude that a license granted by the State 
is, in fact, a protected investment.372 Scholars, however, fail to question 
whether such a conclusion promotes the optimum global order or benefits 
the international community.373 Because a license entails supervision, it may 
include elements relating to the safety of personnel, royalty payments to the 
host-State, or rules concerning debris mitigation. Revocation or amendment 
of a license may thus be subject to investment arbitration should it adversely 
affect the investors’ gains in wealth. As a corollary, subjecting such a license 
to investment protection may affect the policy choices of the host-State in 
respect of the investor’s activities.  
The exact scope of protection will depend on the circumstances, includ-
ing the expectations of the specific investor and any agreement on regulatory 
stability. Emerging State participants are, however, incentivized to provide 
such assurances because they may otherwise be unable to participate in space 
activities and the benefits they entail. As Jean-Michel Marcoux explained, 
“[w]hen facing the proposition of a large investment on its territory several 
countries are ready to offer incentives and adopt a legal framework that is 
consistent with the interests of foreign investors.”374 
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Emerging State participants may offer corporations long-term benefits 
in wealth while compromising safety and environmental protection. Extend-
ing investment protection to space activities risks perpetuating those policies 
and exacerbating the regulatory race to the bottom. Although the extent of 
the risk is unclear, and it is unknown whether a tribunal would be willing to 
compensate an investor for a regulatory change correcting an internationally 
harmful activity, there are few justifications for providing such protection in 
the first place. 
Understanding why the rationales of investment protection do not apply 
to space requires returning to the triangular relationship mentioned above 
and considering the interests and goals of the participants involved: 
 
The relationship between the investor and the host-State is quite straight-
forward and revolves around gains and risks to wealth. For the host-State, 
the investment generates domestic gains through the investor’s infusion of 
capital and technology. Investors invest to increase their own wealth but as-
sume many risks in engaging in foreign investment. These risks include, inter 
alia, expropriation, regulations tantamount to expropriation, revocation of 
benefits, failure to provide safety and protection, and arrest and imprison-
ment. Such risks concern the regulatory and police powers of the host-State, 
which may adversely affect a foreign national or corporation due to a pref-
erence for domestic interests over those of foreigners.375 In agreeing to avail 
the investors of investment protection, host-States ameliorate, to a certain 
degree, some of these risks.376 
 
375. See Sykes, supra note 363, at 499. 














Investors engaged in outer space activities, however, assume significantly 
lower risks from decisions of host-States. Space investments are not physi-
cally located under the control of the host-State, which makes the prospect 
of expropriation or failure to provide protection quite limited. The investor 
may operate and control the property from another State, thus not being 
personally subject to the host-State’s police powers. The only element sub-
jected to home-State control is the “license,” but it is not difficult to imagine 
that an alternative “license” might be issued by another State, and the invest-
ment transferred to the jurisdiction and control of a different participant. 
Therefore, investors would assume a very low level of risk while immersing 
themselves in the protections offered by investment treaties.  
But a more stunning realization stems from the fact that home-States 
have little, or perhaps even opposing, incentives when it comes to protecting 
foreign space investments by their citizens. Home-States do not conclude 
investment protection treaties solely for the benefit of their citizens but ra-
ther are driven by their own goals and incentives.377As Marcoux put it, “Act-
ing as the home states of foreign investors, capital exporting states perceive 
foreign investment as a means to increase trade with host states, secure pro-
curement in natural resources for their economy and ensure the repatriation 
of parts of the profits earned by national investors.”378 Space investments 
flip these incentives. 
Home-States of space investors will likely be the developed space-capa-
ble States, as is evident from current private ventures.379 Because these in-
vestments can be controlled from anywhere, home-States gain little from 
having such investments licensed under the domestic laws of another State. 
As host-States can only attract space investors through regulations, these 
may allow for increased debris or otherwise “relax the enforcement” of mit-
igation standards,380 thus augmenting investors’ gains in wealth. But the pro-
liferation of debris increases the costs for all participants in space, with the 
largest users arguably incurring most costs and risks. Foreign investments in 
space could be detrimental to the interests of space-capable States, not only 
from the perspectives of lost revenue, jobs, or resources, but also due to 
increased costs from debris and potential security and environmental risks. 
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States have excluded certain types of investments from investment pro-
tection due to adverse effects on their national interests. As Michael Lough-
lin has shown, the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement has mod-
ified the North American Free Trade Agreement to exclude from investment 
protection, and thus promotion, both through ratione materiae and ratione per-
sonae, investments deemed detrimental to U.S. economic interests.381 Given 
the risks posed to their national interests, space-capable States should strive 
to exclude foreign investments in outer space from investment protection to 
discourage investors from transitioning. 
One caveat for such a policy concerns the prospect of investors negoti-
ating such terms via contracts with potential host-States. Julian Arato re-
cently suggested that contracts may replace investment protection by allow-
ing investors and States to contract around treaty terms.382 The problem with 
Arato’s suggestion from an investment protection perspective is that he 
views investments narrowly as single transactions. In contrast, investments 
are dynamic long-term processes, with interactions occurring throughout the 
life of an investment. Investment protections are placed through treaties pre-
cisely because the incentives of the host-State change after the initial costs 
are incurred.383 After an investment has been made, the host-State has sig-
nificant leverage to negotiate around treaties for any subsequent investment.  
However, for space-related activities, negotiating contracts between in-
vestors and States can alleviate some of the dire effects of relying on bilateral 
investment treaties. Contracts are weaker than investment treaties as instru-
ments for the promotion and protection of investments. Breach of an in-
vestment treaty, or withdrawal from it, has broader implications than the 
breach of a single contract with an investor.384 More importantly, shifting 
investor-State disputes from the realm of investment protection to one re-
sembling commercial arbitration through contracts may even entail benefits 
for public order. It will allow countersuits and be subject to a “public policy” 
exception for enforcement. 
The exclusion of space-based investments from investment protection 
may be achieved through provisions made part of any instrument concerning 
space debris or by forcing the renegotiation of existing treaties. Whatever 
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the specific mechanism space-capable States may successfully employ, it will 
be consistent with the distinct situations of such investments, and it will in-
crease the overall gain in values by arresting, even slightly, the regulatory race 
to the bottom.  
 
ii. Exclusion of Investments Attracted to “Debris Havens” 
 
As explained above, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement pioneered a provision that 
recognizes that the use of lenient environmental rules to attract investments 
should be avoided. Both treaties, however, failed to provide for the enforce-
ment of this normative obligation. Space debris mitigation provides an op-
portunity to avoid this mistake and exclude assets procured through the vi-
olation of normative environmental obligations from qualified investments.  
In a similar vein, many investment treaties include a caveat that covered 
investments must have been conducted lawfully under domestic law. In-
tended to confront corruption in investment practice, these provisions ex-
clude investment protection for investments procured through bribes or in 
violation of domestic law. While many investment cases include allegations 
of misconduct, few have excluded protection based on those claims. Exclu-
sion based on corruption is debatable, to say the least; it is a claim available 
to one side to the detriment of the other, although both are in the wrong.385 
An investor is denied the right to benefit from conduct that is denounced 
internationally, even if officials demanded it as a de facto prerequisite for 
investment. 
The same rationale applies to space debris. Engaging in space invest-
ments through flag of convenience States to the detriment of the other mem-
bers of the international community is not only unfair, but it should similarly 
exclude international protection. From an international perspective, by pro-
moting such conduct, the host-State not only fails to consider the interests 
of foreign stakeholders but acts contrary to the interests of the international 
community, thus adversely affecting all participants.  
Concluding that an investment was attracted through a “debris haven” 
would require a tribunal to evaluate whether the regulations in place or their 
enforcement were, in fact, unacceptably lenient. If the case concerns the 
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“weakening” of enforcement, an analysis by a tribunal can be straightfor-
ward, but to conclude that regulations were lenient to begin with will require 
a comparison to other States. As the claim would be raised by the State vis-
à-vis the investor, the State would be required to muster evidence in that 
respect. The history of investment treaties shows that when arbitrators are 
provided with generic terms and broad obligations, they tend to develop 
those terms and obligations through interpretation and application.386 While 
the application of such a treaty may take on a life of its own, when an investor 
actively engages in conduct to the detriment of the international community 
for personal gain, international law should not protect and perpetuate the 
wrongful conduct.  
For the reasons given above, space-capable States possess an incentive 
to promote such a rule when it comes to space debris, even if they lack such 
incentives for other environmental concerns. Space debris is a prime candi-
date for pioneering an amendment to the international investment system 
that may, in the future, spillover and increase gains in health and environ-
mental protection in other areas as well. 
    
C. Stage of Regulation 
 
The regime proposed in the second stage would only remain effective as long 
as participants cooperate, States retain significant control, and the number 
of interactions remains moderate. Certain intervening factors may render 
this regime ineffective, but as space activities increase, it will necessarily de-
velop further. Such development may generate claims to install some of the 
instruments proposed by scholarship today, but that would only become ef-
fective and feasible when situations and interactions change. The following 
analysis of these possible developments could facilitate a quick and informed 
response by policymakers.  
A significant increase in private space activity may reach a point at which 
State authorization and supervision will no longer constitute effective regu-
lation. In addition, as evident from the Artemis Accords,387 claims will be 
made for evolving security zones around space installations, perhaps devel-
oping to resemble those around artificial islands and ocean installations.388 
Absent effective State control, and with participants subject to multiple ju-
risdictions, interactions will begin to resemble those observed in maritime 
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shipping or commercial aviation. This may generate the incentives necessary 
to establish legally binding rules for safety, which will likely include debris 
prevention and avoidance.389 
With the development of technology necessary to remove space debris 
from orbit, and especially should such debris removal activities become cost-
effective, the interpretation and application of jurisdiction and responsibility 
will be forced to evolve accordingly. In respect of space resources, the 
United States chose to present its claim to recognize property rights as an 
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty rather than to attempt its amend-
ment. This was a sensible path. The treaty includes provisions for the prohi-
bition of sovereignty claims, certain military activities, and the placing of nu-
clear weapons in outer space. Any attempt to renegotiate the treaty may have 
led to the renegotiation of these provisions, which is premature at this junc-
ture. A similar path should be chosen in respect of space objects. Through 
interpretation, participants will need to further qualify claims to retain juris-
diction over inoperable space objects, supported by the evolving context, 
including the technological ability to remove them in a commercially viable 
way.  
A critical intervening element in the development of the regime for space 
debris may stem from security considerations. Significant proliferation of 
space debris by space-incapable States and corporations will necessarily ad-
versely affect the security interests of space-capable States. Thus, if the re-
gime proposed above was adopted, but participants, particularly space-inca-
pable States, failed to comply, incentives could be generated for legally bind-
ing mitigation targets. Were the security interests of space-capable States se-
riously undermined, even before a Kessler Syndrome materializes, they 
would be incentivized to use their economic and military power to enforce 
compliance with rigid debris standards. Whether or not such an eventuality 




Space activities by both public and private entities usher in a new age of 
human development. But the new “Space Age” offers challenges in human 
rights, governance, and environmental concerns. This article analyzed the 
challenge to governance posed by space debris through the perspective of 
 












policy-oriented jurisprudence. It evaluated the development of the global or-
der through a process of claims and counterclaims that will shape the devel-
opment of the rules through a dynamic, evolutionary, international lawmak-
ing process. Based on this analysis, the article proposed adopting a dynamic 
regime to mitigate space debris as the next stage of the regime’s evolution 
toward a feasible, effective, and manageable global order.  
 
